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EDITORIAL

CANON LILLEY is one of those few writers whose every book is a treasure; and his Paddock Lectures for 1931, published under the title of *Reason and Revelation*,* is no exception to the rule. We find here all the qualities for which he has laid a generation of busy readers so greatly in his debt—a ripe acquaintance with Aquinas and the scholastics and an unrivalled capacity for distilling the essence of their teaching into modern speech; a habit of defining his terms, which is a constant tonic to the mind; a style which combines compact thought and close-knit argument with a fervour of faith and feeling often breaking into eloquence. Canon Lilley provides at once the justification and the rebuke of controversy—its justification, because he insists that issues must be faced, not burked, and especially the issues between old and new methods of thought; and its rebuke, because he shows that prejudice and partisanship are not essentials of controversy, but indeed the chief hindrances to its fruits being reaped. It is amazing to find the teachings of Aquinas and of Father Tyrrell brought into synthesis as they are here, and a real Liberal Catholicism emerging which does full justice to the truth in both.

Canon Lilley's problem in *Reason and Revelation* is to maintain the necessity of the concept of Revelation, and to give the concept a definite meaning, in an age which is in danger of forfeiting it by inadvertence. He claims that theology has never squarely faced the issues raised by the abandonment—the right and necessary abandonment, as he believes—of the traditional idea of the inerrant and oracular authority of Scripture. For Catholic and Protestant alike the Bible was, until recently, the exclusive and infallible Revelation of God; and the full extent of the breach with tradition entailed by any admissions of modern critical principles has never, he says, been

* *Reason and Revelation*, by A. L. Lilley. S.P.C.K., 1932. 4s. 6d. net.

adequately realized. In particular, he is emphatic in asserting that the tendency to substitute the authority of the Church for that of the Bible, however attractive on the surface, is doomed to failure; for it is the Scriptures which authenticate the Church, and not *vice versa*, in all but a purely chronological sense. The greater part of these Lectures is devoted to showing the many aspects of the problem of Revelation, and how closely it is bound up with such fundamental issues as the relations of the natural and the supernatural, and of faith and knowledge; and we are led through a fascinating history of the main ideas on these subjects from Augustine's time to our own. Finally, in the last chapter, entitled "Towards Revision," Canon Lilley intimates the line of approach which he considers most helpful towards the solution of the problem.

We must content ourselves here with summing up the main points of this closing chapter. In its fundamental teaching the old doctrine of Revelation was right—i.e., in its insistence that the Bible contains the Word of God, and that the truth and knowledge so communicated could not possibly have been attained by man's unaided reason. Religious knowledge is of a different order, and reached by a different method, from all other knowledge; and it is founded upon "the impressions of the nature of an invisible Power or Order beyond us arising, apparently, out of the immediate action of that Power or Order upon us." It has, that is to say, a supernatural origin, and rests on the divine initiative. But the old doctrine was wrong in two respects. It was wrong in its exclusiveness: it did not see what was involved in believing in God "as *Eternal Word, Eternal Revealer*," nor realize that all religion, however primitive and wheresoever found, is revelational in character. All religion, that is to say, is the result of divine impressions on the mind of man. And the problem presented by ethnic religions is a problem of arrested development—an arrest for which Canon Lilley finds the cause in the tendency to embody (and ossify) divine revelations in rite and ceremony in such a way that these embodiments are regarded as final, and no room is left for further revelations to come.

Again, the old doctrine was wrong in the *criteria* it used to authenticate the Scriptures as the Word of God—namely, miracles and prophecies; for both are found in other contexts. On the

other hand, the appeal to miracle had, to use Canon Lilley's phrase, "a deeper probe." For the miracles were deeply embedded in a history which was felt to be "a continuous Divine Act,* God's continuous action upon and through a particular people, preparing a fuller and fuller disclosure of His will of redemptive love towards man up to the personal revelation of that will in His Incarnate Word." The real authentication of the Scriptures as "the classical Revelation of Divine Truth" is to be found in the fact that every form of religion, even the most primitive, is to be found in the Bible; that it is no stranger to arrested development; and that it sets every type and level in relation to a main movement of Revelation which is progressive and culminates in One whom men of all nations worship as the Light of the World.

Next month's issue will be largely devoted to the Oxford Movement Centenary, and will include contributions from Professor Cock, Dr. H. C. Colles, the Rev. E. Milner-White and others, together with an interesting letter from Bishop Talbot on the genesis of *Lux Mundi*.

* This point might, we think, have been developed more fully. It receives interesting illustration in the LXX, where λόγος and ῥῆμα are frequently used to connote "act;" or "deed." Cf. 2 Sam. xi. 11, 27, xvii. 19; 2 Kings xv. 21, 22, 26, xvii. 12. The usage throws an important light on the concreteness of Jewish thought, of which the doctrine of the Word of God affords many illustrations.

A RETURN TO NEW TESTAMENT CHRISTOLOGICAL CATEGORIES

IN using the title "Christological Categories," we have a real use for the second word and do not simply mean "Christology." The word "Categories" conveys a distinction which we take to be important, and to be among other things the means of removing a well-known prejudice. People exclaim: "What is all this about two natures joined but unmixed in one hypostasis? Who was ever saved by believing such propositions?" To which the usual rejoinder is: "Of course no one ever was. But this definition does not really pretend to be positive saving truth: on the contrary, in this formula the wisdom of the Church merely erects a *No road this way* sign in the mouth of certain theological bypaths, which, as experience has proved, lead nowhere but into a bog." But with this *No road* theory we are not satisfied. What it says is true, but it does not say enough. Certainly it would not have satisfied the Fathers who devised the formulas: else they would not have turned them into hymns. No one would make hymns out of *No road* signs. Moreover, it may be rejoined, *No road* signs, in blocking the bypaths, point us down the main road. The only alternative would be that all paths are blocked, and we are to sit down and cry. But that is certainly not intended. Thus the formulæ can block the false in no other way than in pointing out the true. We are thus driven back to the question: Are such formulæ the saving truth, and, if not, what is the use of them? And it is in answering this question that we value the distinction contained in the word "Categories."

What do we say, then? We say that the saving truth is fully and adequately contained in the Scriptures. We are saved, not by the cold formulæ which define orthodoxy, but by truths with some flesh and blood to them, as that God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son. These are the truths which may enter into our prayers and colour our lives. Now, when we entertain the thought of such a truth, two elements can be distinguished in our doing so. There is the complex of ideas and images that we have consciously before our minds, as expressed, for example, in the words of Scripture just quoted. But also there is the intellectual frame in which we set them. This intellectual frame is most probably not brought consciously before our mind: we are not thinking *about* it, and yet it gives all its force to what we are thinking about. God so loved the world, that He gave His son. While still

thinking this same scriptural, saving proposition, we may set it in a frame of rank Polytheism, of mere ethical naturalism (in which case "only Son" might mean "the only man who ever happened to succeed in being sinless"), or again of Orthodoxy. We need not change the words: but the meaning will be wonderfully different in each case. As Polytheism or as Natural Ethicism one would doubt that the saving truth was saving truth at all. Now, whenever we are thinking, we must be thinking somehow, whether or not we are at the moment conscious of that "how": we must be thinking our thought in some intellectual frame or another: we may be mixing several, or jumping from one to another: but mixed or straight, the framework is there, and with sufficiently careful introspection, sufficient power of analysis, a sufficient command of theological concepts, we could discover and express what that framework is. Metaphysicians are in the habit of saying that every man is bound to be thinking according to some system of metaphysics, good or bad. This may or may not be true: it may be possible to keep one's thoughts in regions which all sane metaphysical systems treat alike. But it certainly is true that everyone who thinks the thoughts of revealed religion has already moved on to ground where he is bound to think according to one theological system or another, good, bad, or indifferent, conscious or unconscious. Such a system or framework is what we are at the moment calling a "category." And we take it to be the business of formal, theoretical theology to discover and lay down the best categories for our spiritual use, since some are admittedly a great deal better than some others. Let us take one example before proceeding to our main theme. What is Professor Streeter doing in the most directly theological part of his book *Reality*? He is handling the Gospel facts, but he is presumably not proposing to *alter* them, to give us a modified set of Gospel truths, to rewrite the New Testament. What, then, is he doing? He is providing the scientifically-minded modern with anyhow one way of conceiving those facts, one frame in which he can so think them as to obtain the meaning of them, without offending his reason. And what is this way of conceiving? It is, if we interpret rightly, that the life of our Lord, and above all His Passion and the disciples' experience of His return, present us with a perfect picture in human terms of the spirit of the Reality at the heart of things, dramatized, for our better understanding, on the stage of history. Now that is nothing else but one way of seeing the point (in a religious sense) of the Gospel facts, without touching the facts themselves. It is *one* way, and for Professor Streeter's apologetic purposes that is sufficient. But if it is meant as the only category, or as the fundamental

category to which all the others are to be reduced, then it becomes an impoverished category that unspeakably empties the faith of the Incarnation, and the very fact (if it is a fact) that many Christians in our own day seem unable to think Christology in terms of any other category but this of Christ as the living picture of God's Eternal Nature goes to show how important it is for theologians to get to work to find which the really necessary categories are, and to express them in a manner intelligible to their critically-minded contemporaries.

Perhaps this illustration from Professor Streeter will help to bring us to our main point. The Professor intends (we have assumed) to let the Gospel of St. Mark and St. Paul stand, so far as the flesh-and-blood saving truths go, but to rephrase for moderns the categories in which they are thought. But now, how far is it open to us to do this? Admittedly the New Testament writers, not being critical theologians, did not explicitly state, still less discuss, their categories: at the same time they certainly used categories, for one cannot think without. We ask, then, how far can we, in repeating their sentences, mean at all the same thing as they did, so far as real religious significance goes, unless we discover the categories that they used, and ourselves use them? It might seem plausible at first sight to say that unless we keep their categories we shall be preaching "another Jesus," though in the same words. But this is too simple: for everyone admits that part of the framing of their thought was ephemeral: to some extent, at least, the change of time means the change of categories, for else Christianity has neither growth nor adaptation. The problem, then, is to discover what part of their categories is permanent and what changeable. The relativist assumption that sooner or later all categories are bound to change is quite unjustifiable. For the essential relations of human spirits with one another and with God do not change.

How was it, then, that St. Paul was able to think to himself a Christology so powerful and so unimpeded, so natural, so free? He was a saint: stood near to Christ: had not begun to bother himself about theoretical problems. Maybe: but also he thought, and we are concerned to know how. Without precision of speculation, he yet thought Christ's life, death and resurrection as the unique saving act of God in a unique Person. And what strikes one is that, though unique, his Christ is not isolated as any modern thinker's Christ tends to be. For with us, here stands God unchangeable on the firm ground of Eternity. And there past His feet, as it were, yet depending upon Him mysteriously in its every part, flows the stream of the world's history, its either end lost in the haze

of unimaginable distance. And now we suddenly assert that one fleck on the surface of this river is the personal intervention and presence of God Himself. It seems an unreal, unmeaning assertion. Or at the best we can say we meant that one patch of the water was providentially unruffled, and God's face perfectly (as such perfection goes) reflected in it. You will very likely assert that this is to bias the issue by choosing a far too transcendentalizing image. Does not the modern mind precisely delight in thinking God present and active in the whole process of nature and life of our spirits? But will more pantheistic conceptions really help the matter? Conceive, if you will, of God as the Sun and our lives as the very rays that issue from Him and create the varied world of colour. Then, if you like, God does everything, is everything. But this does not help you. For God in the proper and special sense must still be defined as the centre and not the circumference, as the eternity from which the temporal issues and not the temporal itself. So that if Christ is defined as God in the special sense, we are still making a purely isolated statement—viz., that one spot on the illimitable circumference is somehow or other the centre itself. But if we define Christ as God only as we ourselves are God, then He is no more God than we, save in degree of excellence.

But St. Paul's Christ is not isolated so: not merely in the sense that He stands at the height of a heaven and lower air peopled with angels and demons of all magnitudes, as well as by semi-human, semi-angelic figures like Adam, Enoch, Moses, Elijah. These do not help us: neither did they greatly help St. Paul, since it was precisely his contention that beside Christ these beings were just nothing at all. But even if they helped St. Paul out, they cannot help us out: for though apparently the Neo-Thomists can, we cannot make anything of the Angelology. For us it is an indubitable example of that part in New Testament thinking which philosophy has since stripped away. But there is a more significant respect in which St. Paul's incarnate Christ has not the meaningless isolation of ours. We may put it thus. In the Incarnation we attribute to the Eternal God a career in time and on the historical plane. For us His career is isolated: for St. Paul not so, but simply the centre of a temporal and historical career of God which began with the creation of Adam and is to end with the Judgment. It is a commonplace to say that the Hero of the Old Testament legends and histories is the God of Israel: and of the Book of the Acts, the Holy Ghost. For St. Paul, Christ is not isolated, because God has always from time to time been personally intervening in history, and one supreme intervention is only the natural completion

of the series. For God's acts towards the human race do for him form a series, and a unilinear series at that, covering the whole history of the race past and still to come, and making up a temporal "life" or "career" of God towards man, the execution of a single intelligible plan. For St. Paul, God's act in expelling Adam from Eden, in calling Abraham, in giving Moses the law, was as absolutely and indubitably God's personal intervention as was the resurrection of Christ. Not, of course, as great or as significant an intervention, but none the less as true and as unqualified an intervention, as certain and as necessary a unit in the series that I am calling at the moment the divine career. Thus, while for us the problem of Christology tends to be how we shall attribute to God as a personal career one human life, one fleck (as we have put it) on the surface of the portentous, to us endless stream of history: for the Pauline scheme, on the other hand, the problem would rather be how, alongside of God's eternal life, we are to conceive His temporal life, His career in His dealings with the temporal world, a career covering the whole length of that stream of history of which we have spoken—a stream for St. Paul not of indefinite length, but with a clear beginning and as clear an end. It is this radical equation of a divine career with the span of history which is the supremely important element in the biblical Creation and World-End theology. *Urgeschichte und Endgeschichte*, Pre- and Post-history: the Barthians, whatever their other errors, have done good service in putting the two together. For we are far too lightly inclined to think that the eschatological problem in the New Testament is simply concerned with a mistaken expectation of an early *parusia*. No: that is easily settled: but the real problem remains—viz., that of the whole category of this divine career co-terminous with history. Now although we do not believe that the world was created in the year 4004 and destroyed in the year 70, though we may feel rather shaky about Adam, Abraham and Moses, can we none the less make anything of the divine career category? Do we need it? We propose now to try to give this category a fair trial, and to see whether, if admissible, it tends to clear up Christological difficulties, and to enable us to think the Incarnation at all as St. Paul thought it.

We will plunge straight away into the metaphysical. For we have seen that St. Paul, while believing in the eternity, unchangeableness and all-creativity of the God from whom, through whom and for whom all things are, none the less makes this God enter as a particular agent into the affairs of this world that so utterly depends upon Him in all things. God the common ground of *all* agents and actions, and God one

agent interacting with others. How can we think such a combination? Let us have the illustration first and the exposition afterwards. The illustration is this. I form in my mind the thought of the dog at home just by thinking about the animal. So far the thought is the pure product of my will: I create it because I choose, and keep it there so long as I choose: its creation and its preservation depend equally on my volition. And now, while still exercising this first activity of my mind, I add to it a second: for now I direct my attention upon this thought, I make it in its turn the object of my attention. What my will puts there and holds there, I now begin with a second act of will to treat as a self-standing reality towards which I take up an attitude, just as I might do towards another being separate from myself: by making the thought my object I treat it in a sense as man to man and not creator to creature: as something to be reckoned with, not as something to be made or changed. And yet all the time the thought is only kept there by that other first activity of my will, and would disappear if that were withdrawn.

Now, does not the religious mind naturally think of God as similarly exercising two distinct activities towards His creatures? The first by which He puts and keeps them there, the second by which He takes up an attitude towards them, brings Himself in a manner on to their level, in so far as He no longer creates or alters their being, but admitting them to be what they are, allowing them a self-standing reality that He leaves inviolate, proceeds to act towards them. Conversely, those to whom God shows His love, to whom He reveals Himself, are only there to be loved, to receive revelation, in so far as a prior act of God's will has constituted and continues to constitute their being from moment to moment. That is obvious. But the point we wish to bring out is that these two activities of God must be thought by us as distinct: it is not possible for us to think of them as one single activity. "Distinct," not "separate." Certainly the second activity cannot be thought of as separated from the first: God cannot act towards what He has not first created and does not yet sustain. But ideally it is very possible for us to think of the first without the second: it is possible to entertain the idea of the God of Spinoza, whose Being issues in the existence of all things, but who takes up no attitude of love or help to what He has made: He may be loved, but does not love in return. This is *le Dieu des philosophes et des savants*: but it is precisely the advance that religion makes beyond such metaphysics, that it adds to God's first or creative activity His second, or personal—for it is only by the second activity that God becomes personal for us by entering into a personal

relation with us. It is purely a matter of words, of definition, whether personality should or should not be ascribed to a merely creator God. We do not make the creator God personal by ascribing to Him a metaphysical transcendence, or by saying that He is to be best conceived in categories of spirit: but only by adding the second act to the first, and ascribing to Him a personal relation with us, by entering into which He chooses to set Himself in a manner on one level with us.

The next point to be made is, that while in the first activity we naturally think God as eternal, in the second we inevitably think Him under the form of time. Mind, this is simply to state the way in which we do and must think, the actual shape that our thoughts assume if we think about such things at all. First, then, that to the idea of God's first, or creating and sustaining, activity naturally corresponds the idea of Eternity. About this scholastic tradition is clear and sufficient. It conceives change and temporality as being the very differentia of this imperfect world. From God the immovable and unchanging source of all being issues the world of growth and decay. He is the Sun, the creatures are the play of His light on the broken waters of time. The creative act is simple, pure and eternal: all the temporality, all the division, all the change, lie on the side of what is created. Or if anyone wishes to be precise and say that we cannot think any act (even creation) without at least the ghost of the form of time: yet we do not think in that time any change or difference: it is perfectly single and homogeneous, and therefore unmeasurable. This mode of the world's correlation with God is the one philosophers have most gladly looked at, as being moderately clear and satisfactory to reason. Now secondly: that to God's second or personal activity naturally belongs in our thought the form of time. This is a plain issue. Let us show it by a *reductio ad absurdum*. We will try to believe that here also God's act towards us is simple, single and eternally the same: that it only differs from itself in virtue of the differences in the objects upon which it terminates, as the sun's rays produce red, blue and green, not by any difference in the rays, but solely in the surfaces upon which they fall. But if God's action towards His creatures is such, then there is no sense in talking of God's personal dealings with His creatures. It is not, then, that He takes up an attitude towards us: it is we who take up an attitude towards Him; the initiative is ours. The withdrawal of God's grace from the sinner will become analogous to the disappearance of the sunlight from the room when I close the shutters. But no one would call that a personal act of the sun. Similarly the bestowal of God's grace will follow simply from my opening the shutters and letting the sun-

light in. Such ways of thinking reduce the personal action of God to a permanent and changeless spiritual law and spiritual force in the world, on which we may draw at will: God becomes a sun who has not even the freedom of rising and setting and occasionally dodging behind a cloud. Such ways of thinking, in fact, simply reduce God's action by way of Grace to one part of His action by way of creation, to one factor of the world order: they reduce what our argument calls the second activity of God to what we call His first. What, then, someone may wonder; if conceiving God's second activity as His first means denying its sovereign freedom, does that mean that in the first activity He is not truly free? No: for the difference is that the first activity terminates *in* its objects (results in their existence), while the second terminates *upon* objects already existing, and will therefore be determined *by* them and their changes unless it is allowed to take up various attitudes of its own towards them, and that involves its being thought under the form of time.

This *reductio ad absurdum* has assumed that human wills are thought as free, and therefore that God's grace, if reckoned as part of His creative activity, must be thought as a ubiquitous spiritual force governed by a general law in its working, created *alongside* free creatures, for them to draw upon. But while still remaining inside the limits of the "first activity," we have the alternative of denying freedom and so making the salvation of the individual through grace in all the detail of its stages simply a part of the one world system which proceeds from the timeless act of God. Fluctuation between these vicious alternatives is the result of refusing to think the "second activity." Very different is the way in which Christians naturally think. I have repented, and God has forgiven me. That means, He has really done something. He is not the same to me today as He was yesterday. But that means that I inevitably think His act under the form of time. I *think* it so. Of course there is nothing to prevent my attaching to my thought a ticket with the words "Not really temporal" neatly inscribed on it. But that will make no difference to the fact that I am actually thinking under the form of time, and the ticket seems then purely verbal and meaningless, just as when I think of a circle under the form of circularity, but attach a ticket saying *Nota bene*: this circle is square.

We propose to take it for granted, then, that in so far as we think of God as active in personal relation with His creatures, we think of Him as so active in a temporal manner: but that this temporality of His action towards us, so far from removing the essential eternity that He has in Himself and as

creator, precisely presupposes it. Now we will advance a stage further. This God, who acts thus temporally towards temporal creatures, is personal and is one. If, then, He has a career towards this man and that (for, in a manner of speaking, the spiritual career of James or John is only the imperfect, human side of a relationship of which the other side is the career of God towards them)—if so, and if God is personal and one, do not His careers towards X, Y, and Z all form part of one organic whole, His career towards the human race, just as a man's relations with this man and with that form parts of an integral whole, his life, which it is to be hoped has some unity and is dominated by some constant traits of character and purpose? The New Testament writers anyhow thought so. They did not hold that God dealt with each individual quite separately and quite empirically: on the contrary, God dealt with the whole nation Israel through the Mosaic Covenant, and all His dealings with individual Israelites were supplementary to this, and never without reference to it. And here it seems that we may follow them: for even though we cannot be quite so radically simple in the historical detail, even though we cannot quite so confidently lay our finger on this event and that, and say, Here spoke God to mankind *totidem verbis* thus and thus—none the less in principle we see that God deals with Man as well as with men, and brings the individual under the general rubric. And since we believe in the final post-historical consummation of the kingdom to which God's dealings with our race all tend, we may agree that though the world was not created in 4004 nor destroyed in 70, and though we are not sure of all the details of the one divine career and plan in relation to mankind, none the less that career and plan exists, and the biblical scheme, if not an exact map, is at any rate a true symbol of it.

It is now time to see whether the position gained casts any light on Christological problems. Let us take the problem of the Kenosis. An extreme Kenotic doctrine tells us that God the Son laid aside His eternity wholly, and actually became a life germ in the womb of Mary: that He became active from this focus alone, and not also at the same time from the throne of glory. So said certain Lutheran theologians. But this seems superstition and monstrosity. What, did the Creation meanwhile become *ἄλογος*; was it deprived meanwhile of the action of God the Word, *ἐν ᾧ συνέστηκε τὰ πάντα*? Or if, on the other hand, we say that the Son continued His Cosmic functions, but from the womb of Mary, the restricting clause seems merely verbal—we might as well say that He was *not* confined to the womb of Mary, but held also the throne of glory. In fact, it does not differ from the Calvinist alternative—

viz., that God the Son simply added to His other modes of activity without impairing them by conjoining with Himself in a special manner a human life. But that appears, indeed, to leave God in heaven and nullify the Incarnation. Now the contention is that we are out of these difficulties: or rather that we can run them back to one which we see to be a final antithesis lying at the very root of religion itself—that of the temporal activity of the Eternal God. We take the opportunity to observe that in theology this suffices us. If a theologian has discovered that a “difficulty” advanced as a problem burdening the Christian faith can be shown to be merely the particular application of a fundamental antithesis with which any real religion must remain burdened (reduces, say, the alleged incompatibility of moral effort with sacramental grace to the universal problem of Omnipotence and Free Will) he is content, and will leave the final problem to those more metaphysical enquiries that consider the nature and possibility of religion as such. Now are not we in the position of being able to reduce this antithesis, God the Son in heaven and on earth, to a mere case of the antithesis, God Eternal and God acting temporally? For what is the Incarnation but the central point and supreme degree of God’s advance towards us and on to our ground of temporality? It is the terminus of that advance, that movement. Now a movement can be only known for what it is when we know both its termini. Hence, since all the advances of God towards us are steps on the road that reaches from Eternal Being as far as Bethlehem and Calvary, the Christian claims that none but he can know what the real nature of God’s dealings with any man is. For God’s action towards mankind is a swing from the eternal to the temporal and back; God’s proper Being is one pole, and the Incarnation is the other, for there alone the movement actually coincides with the temporal, the divine activity with a complete human life.

If so, then, there will be two ways of looking at the Kenosis of the Incarnation. A narrower view, when we place ourselves within the field of God’s temporal activity, and say, “Ah, He went even as far as that,” when the self-emptying is the descent from the God who dwelt as fire on Sinai to the God who lies in the cradle. A wider view, when we place ourselves (so to speak) at the standpoint of God’s Eternity, and say, “He was not content to rest in it.” Then the self-emptying is the descent from the being of God in Himself to an action towards the creatures on their own level, of which the Incarnation is the culmination.

Now let us return to our original statement of the problem

and face the combatants on each side. We can do so: for we are in a position to satisfy the Calvinists, because we do not propose to assert that the Eternal Son of God was all in the manger and there alone. We are in a position to satisfy the Lutherans, because we do assert that, *in the mode of God's personal action*, the whole "temporal" divine career towards the race does pass through this moment of the Incarnation, no act of God *in this mode* is unconditioned by the Incarnation. This does not mean that during the year A.D. 29 God was not active in the way of grace towards any but those who came within earshot of the Man Jesus Christ. What it does mean is that His grace towards an Athenian philosopher or an Egyptian mystic then still belonged essentially to the movement of *preparatio evangelica*, was essentially a step on the road leading towards Christ: as is His grace towards the heathen still. But it can remain true that all God's acts in this mode of His activity are essentially either pre-incarnational (in such people as those quoted), incarnational (in Jesus on earth) or post-incarnational (in those who derive from Him), and the Incarnation goes to constitute the very nature of them all.

We have declared that the Incarnation marks the supreme and all-determining moment of God's advance into the world of time. That is, we have compared the act of God towards the race in Jesus with that in Moses and others, but distinguished His act in Jesus by calling it "supreme" and "unique" and "determinative," and so forth. We have now to ask: what meaning can we give to these adjectives in terms of our category? Can we, while keeping within this category, so distinguish the Man Jesus from the other instruments of divine activity as to make a place for orthodox belief? Let us see.

So far as what we can know is concerned (and what else can concern us?) the career of God in His dealings with man is very largely made up out of acts and words of men, be it Moses, Elijah, Jeremiah, or, if you choose to say so, Socrates, Luther, Ignatius Loyola. Perhaps in some cases God uses His instrument in a purely external manner, without co-operation of the man's will, as St. John says that Caiaphas prophesied without knowing it. Such cases we should describe as acts of Providence merely. When we advance from these to true cases of Inspiration, the man is more inwardly mastered and used by God. But in no case (outside Christ's) is the whole career or life of God in His dealings with the race thought of as coinciding wholly with the whole life of the man who is His instrument. Thus, the vision of Moses at the bush, his leading of Israel out of Egypt, his promulgation of the Law at Sinai, are all, from the biblical point of view, acts of God in this aspect,

just as much as they are acts or experiences of Moses. But they have not the same context in Moses's life as in God's. The promulgation of the law, in Moses's life, comes between his saying his prayers, perhaps, before and his feeling very tired afterwards; or, if you want the context of his thoughts and intentions rather than of the events in his day, it will be a context of mixed political, self-regarding, and religiously inadequate reflections and plans. Now all this forms no direct part of the career of the self-revealing God. One may express it graphically by saying that the life of Moses can be represented by a serpentine curve, and the divine career by a simple arc which only touches the other tangentially at single points. The divine career, even considered in its purely temporal aspect, refuses to coincide with any human life, not only because of that life's imperfection, but also because of its lack of significance. The life of Moses is not what God has to say to the world, but rather certain acts and words that Moses does and utters; and however good Moses were, this would remain the case: the prophet's word is not the prophet's self. But in Jesus the curve of the divine career coincides wholly with that of the human life: Jesus' words, acts, life, death, all of Him, are the very thing that God is doing and saying.

At first sight this appears to lie open to objection. It cannot be true that *all* our Lord's acts are part of what God is saying and doing through Him, for most of them are not, and never were, known. And apart from this, our Lord's saying His prayers and feeling tired on a certain day seem as little direct parts of the divine career as Moses's doing so, in the sense that they are not distinct steps in the advance of the divine purpose towards man. But we reply that though not all of our Lord's acts (very few of them, in fact) do occupy individually such a position, yet generically they are taken up into the divine career. For example: that our Lord should exercise a ministry of healing might be essential in the Plan: but not that He should heal just this man and that. But then the ministry of healing cannot be actual except in a number of particular instances. So the instances are, though not individually, yet generically relevant. But this principle has the widest application. For a normal, and yet a flawless, human life is surely part of the Plan: but that life can only be actual in an infinity of small happenings, not each necessary as itself, but necessary as the "matter" to be indwelt by the "form": for without some matter the form would not be actual. This is not to disparage the importance of the quality of the individual acts. For it is not only a ministry of healing, but *such* a ministry that is relevant, and this "*such*" can only be seen in examples. It

is necessary, then, that we know sufficient examples, but not all. Now it is easily seen that this principle, while bringing all of Christ's acts, whether by particular or general relevance, into the divine career, will not, on the presuppositions of Christian theology, do the same for Moses. And another difference: not the *whole* plan and career of God passes through the man Moses as through the Man Jesus: for Moses is a point on only one of the lines that lead to the Christ, while another, perhaps, runs through Socrates: but all pass through Jesus. Jesus, then, is God in the only sense in which a man can be—that is, in the sense that Jesus' life (and what is a man but his life?) is without qualification a stretch, and the most significant stretch, of the life of God Himself in His personal dealings with the race of men.

What does this say, it may be asked, for the divine consciousness of the Man Jesus Christ Himself? We have compared God's action towards mankind *through* the prophets and through Jesus: ought we not also to compare God's action towards Jesus Himself with His action towards the prophets themselves? This is a mystery that it may seem absurd to touch in a few lines; but let it be remembered that we are not pretending to deal properly with the mysteries of the faith, but merely to see what light a certain category of thought can throw upon them. Well, the considerations advanced would suggest something like this. The prophet's consciousness of God is like that of other saintly men, except in so far as it is distinguished from theirs by the consciousness the prophet has of his function in the carrying out of the divine career. We do not demand that the prophet should apply theological concepts to the analysis of his function, and the peculiar relation with God that it confers on him: we are content if we find in him a consciousness that amounts to what we should express for him by such concepts. By analogy, the human mind of Jesus should have a consciousness of God as that of a saint's, but distinguished not only by perfect clarity, but also by the unique and incomparably higher function that He performs in the divine career: and here again we shall be content with the discovery in Him of a consciousness amounting to the consciousness of such a function—such an unimaginable function!—but we shall not expect exact theological formulation. And we may claim that if anything can be known of the historical Christ, then we do know that He had such a consciousness of God, and of Himself as the hands and lips of God, of his acts and words as those of God without qualification.

To speak thus is not to pretend we have formulated a neat and clear Christological definition that explodes all mystery. On the contrary, the one stupendous mystery remains: what is

meant at all by this excursion of the eternal into the temporal, by this coincidence of the divine with the human? Surely the category above attributed (perhaps falsely) to Professor Streeter *does* reckon to know what is meant, does explode mystery. We, on the other hand, have no fault to find with the Christmas carol definitions: "The great God of heaven is come down to earth," "The Ancient of Days is an hour or two old," "He sleeps in the manger, He reigns on the throne," "Infinitus fit localis, Immortalis fit mortalis sub ventris umbraculo," and so forth. The sharpness of this paradox, the absolute identity of person, of life, and the absolute distinction of natures, is the very life-blood of faith: we cannot remove this paradox, we cannot get behind it. It is ultimate. That is the meaning of Chalcedon. But though our faith must live in paradoxes, none the less those paradoxes must not be mere empty paradoxes like the square circle; they must be significant, living, be thinkable as thoughts about God. Thus the paradox of the Incarnation is a challenge to the theologian: it says, "Can you think me?" Neither the answer, "No, you remain to me an empty paradox," nor "No, but I can get round you," nor "Yes, I can, by violating history," will pass. Now it might seem the merit of our (if it be such) biblical category that it enables us to think the paradox in a living manner. In defence of this category, then, first: it appears to be scriptural. Second: it is hard to see how we are to manage without it in Christology. Third: even if we thrust it out there, it will turn up anyhow in our very conception of religion itself and of the relation of God with the soul.

But this may be challenged. Is it true that we have really reduced the paradox of the Incarnation to a mere case of the paradox, that the Eternal God must be thought of as acting under the form of time, as soon as we think of His action by way of grace? It may be admitted that the quasi-temporal action by way of grace does apply to the case of the Incarnation: but is there not a further paradox involved in the Incarnation? For we seem to have assumed that the Incarnation is just the complete embodiment and expression of that one paradoxical principle, which does not therein become any more paradoxical in its essential nature, but is merely thrust more unavoidably on our attention: so that the unperceptive mind is capable of supposing that the paradox belongs to the Incarnation only: but falsely. But it may be questioned whether such "unperceptive minds" are in truth merely unperceptive. For many intelligent people find no difficulty in the idea of God's action by way of grace (which action we assume they must think under the form of quasi-temporality), but find the Incarnation

a great stumbling-block. Such might say that it is one thing to conceive God's act under a quasi-temporal form, another to co-ordinate this quasi-temporality with our time-series—indeed, in a manner to identify the two. Let us ask, then, just where in our argument this step is taken. It might seem to have been taken when we advanced to the idea of one career of God towards the human race, and for the reason that this involves the externalizing of God's acts in a "public" medium, and therefore in events and acts of men: there first God's acts might seem to become fixed in members of our time-series. But surely even if we limit ourselves to the arena of the individual's soul, the same thing is already true. For either God's act towards James or John (forgiveness, guidance, grace) does touch or affect their being at a time, and therefore terminates in a temporal event, or else it is not anything. It may not be sensible, it may be inferred, or only afterwards discovered: there may be no complete certainty about it. Still, if it is anything, it terminates in a temporal effect or communication, even though unperceived. And to say: "Yes, but then we can call this temporal event the effect, and still think of the divine act as taking place in the mystery of God," is to say nothing relevant, since the same can be said of God's acts in the Incarnation. We are not denying that God has always one foot (if we may so speak) in Eternity. But it remains true that (1) His act must be thought under a quasi-temporal form, (2) that it is essentially directed towards producing, one should rather say essentially issues as, an event in our time-series. We maintain still, then, that in this aspect the Incarnation is more mysterious only as containing the fullness of the one same mystery. We justly claim, then, to have reached the confines of our sphere. To go further belongs to a different enquiry.

AUSTIN FARRER.

THE REVELATION OF THE HOLY SPIRIT IN THE BIBLE

IN facing the problem of the best method of approaching this subject I had to choose between an attempt to cover the whole field or a deliberate concentration on a specific point.

There is a great deal to be said for a careful study of the gradual unfolding of the Revelation stage by stage through the history of God's dealings with His chosen people as it found expression

in the Old Testament, Apocrypha and New Testament. But I have not the equipment necessary to cover the whole ground, and I felt that it was significant that at the Liverpool Congress the subject, treated in this way, was held to demand two full sessions, and was allotted to three experts. Even to take the New Testament by itself, which would be more within my reach, would involve travelling again over ground already adequately covered by Dr. McNeile and Sir Edwyn Hoskyns, and we might find it difficult to see the wood for the trees. I decided, therefore, on the second line of approach. There can be no doubt that the inmost heart of all that is distinctive in the New Testament revelation of the Holy Spirit sprang from the experience of Jesus. It was for that that the age-long training of Israel was a preparation. From that came the experience of the Apostles as recorded in the Epistles. If we are to get to the heart of our subject, and that means, remember, to enter into nothing less than the reality of that which was symbolized by the Holy of Holies under the Old Covenant, we must go forward by the most direct, intense, and reverent contemplation of the one Way that He has consecrated for us through the veil. That is, "the Way of His flesh." Though heart and spirit may well quail before the task, that is none the less the task required of us. We must study the "Holy Spirit in the experience of Jesus."

Let us go back, then, in thought to the banks of the Jordan, when Jesus, in answer to the call of the Baptist, came out of Nazareth to enrol Himself as one of his disciples. He is about thirty years old; He has grown up in a quiet home in Nazareth working as a carpenter. He bears a name which pledges Him in God's good time to bring salvation to His people. It is surely impossible to believe that, whatever may have been the case with regard to the manner of His birth, He had been brought up in ignorance of the hopes that had attended it. But no details are given us. St. Luke is content to give us, in his first two chapters, what is generally admitted to be a faithful picture of the spiritual atmosphere that Jesus must have breathed in the company of those who were looking for the redemption of Jerusalem. He leaves us wondering whether the music of the canticles, *Benedictus*, *Magnificat* and *Nunc Dimittis*, and the solemn warning given by Simeon to His mother, were ringing in His ears all through His waiting time. St. Luke only gives one direct glimpse into His mind at this time. He shows us a lad of twelve, with a strong sense of duty and a deep and clear consciousness of the Fatherhood of God, to which His whole life was a response.

For further light on how He spent those thirty years we must

depend on inferences from the fruit that they bore in His public ministry. That which is of deepest importance is His study of the Old Testament. His mastery of that could not have been acquired after His public work had begun. He must have brought it with Him to the Jordan, including, we must remember, that which was His characteristic contribution to the interpretation of the purpose of God as revealed through the prophets, His clear vision of the fact that the Son of David must die for His people as "the Servant of the Lord" before He could attain His throne. If you will read the prophets with the eye of a boy whose name pledges Him to bring the salvation of God to the world, and is at the same time heir to the throne of David, you will see how the words of the prophets would little by little have made His task plain to Him, while, as later throughout the ministry, He waited for a signal from His Father to tell Him that the time was ripe. That signal came with the appearance of the Baptist.

The acceptance of Baptism at the hands of John witnessed His obedience to the Father, His sympathy with His brethren, and His readiness to consecrate Himself to death in fulfilment of the work that He had been sent to do on their behalf. From this point of view, the words that He heard would have been at once a gracious acceptance by God of the sacrifice that He offered, and a confirmation of the truth of His intuition into the meaning of the prophets. "Thou art My Son," are the words that confirm His faith in His Messiahship. "My beloved in whom I am well pleased" is an echo of the Lord's delight in His Servant (Isa. xlii. 1 ff.). This public acknowledgment in the presence of the appointed witness gave Him His commission. The gift of the Spirit came with the commission and enabled Him to fulfil it in and through the flesh with which He had clothed Himself. Together these signs marked His entrance then and there into the Kingdom of Heaven. The powers of the age to come were, from that time forward, at work on earth in and through His human nature. The eternal life of communion between the Father and the Son, which He had come to reveal, had become conscious of itself in and through His human faculties. Jesus of Nazareth knew God, and knew that He knew Him, because He kept His commandments.

The Voice, as we have seen, proclaimed Him Son and, by implication, "Servant," the long expected Prince and Saviour at once of Israel and of the world. But the title "Son" was far more than an honorific designation of Messianic Kingship. It was more even than the assurance, under the tenderest of earthly images, of a Fatherly care watching over Him and of His own filial dignity and duty. It was the declaration of an

eternal relationship within the very Being of God Himself; a divine Sonship, which the human race had been called into being to embody and show forth before the eyes of all creation. The Holy Spirit descending and abiding on Him was the seal of His Apostleship—that is, of the commission He had received from the Father for the work that He had to do in and for the world. The Spirit had, no doubt, been with Him from the beginning, but from henceforth He was to be a power working from within the human consciousness of Jesus to enable Him to live before men that life of unbroken communion with the Father by which He was to reveal the Father to men, and the memory of which would lift them up, when they in their turn had become capable of receiving the same Spirit, into their place in the divine Sonship, for the manifestation of which they had been created. For, in this connection, we may think of the waiting time at Nazareth as a period of preparation, which reached its goal when the response of Jesus to His Father's call through the Baptist showed that the Temple of His human Heart was ready to receive the fulness of the divine Indwelling, and so to lay hold of and to wield the powers of the age to come.

Such in outline were the conditions and such the effect of the first appearance in human history of that outpouring of the Spirit which characterizes the New Order introduced by Christianity, and by which the Kingdom of Heaven is gradually extending its sway over the whole life of man. If we wish to go further and study the teaching of the records of His public ministry on the extent to which our Lord's reaction to this indwelling affected His human consciousness and found expression in word and deed, we shall do well, I think, to go back to the Old Testament to see what there was in it by which He could infer the relation in which He was to stand to the Holy Spirit, and what the Holy Spirit would do for Him.

From this point of view one passage stands out at once as bringing the promised "shoot out of the stock of Jesse" into a special relation with the Spirit of the Lord. Isaiah xi. 1 ff. declares that "the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and fear of the Lord." This is the endowment of the King to enable Him to act as God's Vicegerent.

The only other figure with whom the Prophets connect a special outpouring of the Spirit is the "Servant of the Lord." We have seen reason to believe that as such Jesus would feel a special interest in these prophecies. They are: (1) Isa. xlii. 1: "Behold My servant whom I uphold, My servant, in whom My soul delighteth: I have set My spirit upon Him"; and (2) Isa. lxi.

1 ff.: "The spirit of the Lord God is upon Me to preach good tidings to the poor: He hath set Me to bind up the brokenhearted, to proclaim liberty to the captive, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound; to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord, and the day of vengeance of our God; and to comfort them that mourn." As Isa. xi. 2 gives us the endowment of the King, so these two passages describe the relation of the Servant to the Spirit, and give the programme of His Ministry. It is strange that Isa. xi. 2 is not directly quoted in the New Testament. The other two passages are, however, brought into close relation with Jesus. Isa. xlii. 1 is quoted in St. Matt. xii. 18 ff., and there seems, as we have seen, to be a clear echo of it in the Voice from Heaven which accompanied the gift of the Spirit at His Baptism. The second formed the text for the sermon at Nazareth with which St. Luke introduces his account of our Lord's Galilean Ministry. There is also an implied reference to it in the answer which Jesus sent to the Baptist in prison.

If Jesus had learnt to look forward to the fulfilment of these prophecies in His own person, we can understand why He calls the gift of the Spirit which He is to hand to His disciples "the promise of My Father" (Luke xxiv. 49). It must have prepared Him at least in some measure for the teaching of the Baptist, and for the gift that His Baptism would bring to Him.

In any case, the outpouring of the Spirit had a prominent place in the Baptist's preaching. The decisive element in the work of the "Mightier than he" lay just in this, that he would consummate the preparatory Baptism of repentance unto the remission of sins by baptizing men with a holy spirit. He would fill them from on high with a passion for holiness which would be for them an effectual consecration, "putting the law of the Lord within their mind and writing it on their heart." And the mark by which He was to be revealed to the Baptist was the descent and the abiding of the Spirit upon Him.

We have no means of determining at what stage in the Baptist's ministry this fact was made public property. In St. John's account it does not appear until the sign had been fulfilled. And the same may be true of the other accounts, though the record of it precedes the account of the Baptism. We cannot, therefore, say whether Jesus had the knowledge of this element of the Baptist's commission to prepare Him for what was to follow His descent into the Jordan. We know, however, from Acts i. 5 that the Baptism which He was to impart was from the beginning of His public ministry, both for Himself and for His disciples, the appointed goal of His labours.

When we go on to consider the reaction of the human con-

sciousness of our Lord to this gift, after it had come, the Gospels give us far less help than we should have expected. Each of the Synoptists in his own way makes it clear that the first effect of its coming was seen in the retirement of Jesus into the wilderness for His solitary conflict with the Tempter. "Straightway," says St. Mark, "the Spirit sendeth Him forth into the wilderness." "Then," says St. Matthew (iv. 1), "was Jesus led up by the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the Devil." "Jesus," says St. Luke, "full of the Spirit, returned from the Jordan and was led by the Spirit in the wilderness during forty days, being tempted by the Devil." St. Luke alone marks the presence of the power of the Spirit with Jesus at the beginning of His public ministry (iv. 12), and, as we have seen, quotes the text from Isa. lxi. 1 ff., on which our Lord preached at Nazareth, claiming that the promise had been fulfilled, and declaring that the time for preaching the Gospel to the poor had at last come. There is no other direct reference to the presence of the Spirit with the Lord in the Synoptists. We do, however, learn that Jesus Himself claimed that His power over the demons came because He was Himself possessed by the Spirit of God.

In St. John's Gospel special stress is laid indeed upon the Baptist's witness, and on the vision of the descent and abiding of the Spirit to which it referred. But apart from that he has recorded, I think, only two phrases in which our Lord refers to it. The first is vi. 27, when Jesus justifies His claim to be the giver of living bread by the fact that God, even the Father, had "set His seal on Him." The second is in x. 36, where He claims a nearer relation to God than that enjoyed by the Judges of Israel on the ground that He was "One whom the Father had consecrated and sent into the world." In one further passage (iii. 33 ff.) the Evangelist explains his own statement that to accept the testimony of Jesus was to attest the faithfulness of God on the ground that the words of Jesus, by virtue of His commission and the unlimited gift of the Spirit that accompanied it, were none other than the words of God Himself.

The number of relative passages is small. To sum up the points which they bring before us:

- (1) The gift of the Spirit marked out Him on whom it was bestowed as in some sense God's peculiar treasure.
- (2) It was a link between Him and God who commissioned Him.
- (3) It was the power that enabled Him to do His mighty deeds.
- (4) It inspired His utterances, making His words in very truth not His, but His Father's.

These are, no doubt, significant consequences arising from the presence of the Spirit with the Lord. We might well be content with the truths implied in them, though they do not take us very far, did not the practical importance of a clearer understanding of the laws of the Spirit's working in the hearts of men force us to ask whether there is any other source to which we can look for light on the inner side of the relation between Jesus and the Holy Spirit of which these consequences are the outward expression. It may be, of course, that we do not enquire wisely concerning this, as the Gospels seem to be silent. There is, however, a source from which at least reflected light may come and which we must examine. Our Lord taught His disciples what the gift of the Holy Spirit would mean for them. It is natural to assume that this teaching sprang from His experience of what the presence of the Spirit with Him in His Ministry had meant for Himself. If so, this teaching will contain material which, rightly interpreted, may give substantial assistance.

The teaching to which I refer belongs almost exclusively to the Farewell Discourse in the Upper Chamber. It groups conveniently round the three titles under which the Spirit is referred to. The most familiar is "the Holy Ghost" or "Spirit." The disciples, our Lord tells them, were to be baptized "in" or "with" it. He bids them "lay hold of the Holy Spirit." Holiness is therefore a determining characteristic of the Spirit. He is, what St. Paul calls Him, "a Spirit of Consecration." He marks out those who receive Him as "belonging to God," not merely by an outward sign, but by an inward reality of spiritual self-surrender. The result of His coming is to fill men with power from on high, and to qualify them to be His witnesses. From this teaching we infer that our Lord's own human nature had been filled with power when the Holy Spirit came upon Him, and enabled Him to be His Father's witness in the world, and to act and speak in His Father's Name. We may add that the Holy Spirit in them, being the same as the Holy Spirit in Him, and coming to them through Him, would unite them to the Son as He united the Son to the Father.

The bond is in all cases "moral," not "mechanical." It works from within the human personality, quickening its self-surrender to the divine Will. It affects the whole man, and is not limited to the conscious side of our being. Its perfect work is seen, however, in the willing surrender of personal predilections in obedience to the call of God. So Baptism in the Spirit consummates the Baptism "in water unto the remission of sins," and opens the way by which the Sovereignty of God

can have force among men. It brings in the Kingdom of Heaven.

This being the characteristic effect of the Holiness of the Spirit on those to whom He comes "in the Son's name," we can see why St. Paul calls Him the "Spirit of the Son" or "of adoption"—that is, "the Spirit whereby we claim our place before the world as fully responsible sons of God." He says boldly, "as many as are led by the Spirit of God, the same are the sons of God." There is an intimate connection between the possession of the Spirit and the power to bear the name of the Son of God before men. This Name, remember, is not a label arbitrarily fixed from without. It corresponds to an inward reality. So the bestowal of "the Name" is the sign of the new birth. He, on whom the Spirit comes, is made a member of the new order. He is born from above. I cannot therefore help suspecting that our Lord's teaching to Nicodemus was the outcome of the experience through which He Himself passed at His Baptism. His humanity stepped into a new world, when the heavens opened above Him on the banks of the Jordan, as a babe is set free from the darkness and confinement of the womb, to exercise and develop unsuspected capacities in response to its new environment.

The second title is "the Comforter." Unlike "the Holy Spirit," which appears in the Old Testament and on the lips of the Baptist before our Lord makes use of it, neither "the Comforter" nor the third title "the Spirit of Truth" was known until He gave utterance to them. "Comforter" is first used indirectly as a description of the office which the Holy Spirit would fulfil in relation to the disciples after the visible presence of their Master had been withdrawn. "I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Comforter, to be with you for ever." The word is not easy to render in English. At times it seems better to give up the attempt and write the Greek word in English letters as "Paraclete." In 1 John ii. 1 the same word is translated more in accordance with strict etymology by the Latin word "Advocate." It suggests "the counsel on whom we rely for defence before a judge." As such it is the exact opposite of "Satan," which means "the counsel for the prosecution," or "the Accuser" (Rev. xii. 10).

As applied to the Holy Spirit, our Lord's words suggest another figure, for which "Comforter" in its old English meaning of "strengthenener" is as good as any we are likely to find. For the Holy Spirit, in our Lord's description of Him, was to take up the work which our Lord Himself had been doing while He was upon earth. If we think what it must have meant to the disciples to have Him ever at hand to enlighten their

darkness, to correct their faults, to inspire them with His example, and to encourage them by the assurance of His sympathy in face of the dangers by which they were beset, we shall not have any difficulty in grasping the fulness of "the comfort" that the consciousness of the presence of the Holy Spirit with them would bring, if He was to be to them all that Jesus had been.

If we set ourselves to define these functions in Old Testament language, we find ourselves appropriating almost mechanically the words of Isa. xi. 2. "The Comforter" can be none other than "the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of the knowledge and fear of the Lord." The Spirit, in other words, would be for the disciples what He had been for their Master, and the fact that He would take the place of the Master to them admits of a simple explanation, if the Master had been handing on to them all the time just what He Himself had been receiving. If, that is, Jesus had been to them throughout their discipleship just what the Spirit of the Father had been to Him, then indeed the other Comforter would be no stranger when He came. Even while Jesus was speaking to them He was already by their side.

This, however, is far from being a complete account of the "Comforter's office." He was not a substitute for the Master even when He was taking on the Master's work, and so far filling His place. He was to be a living bond between the disciples and their Lord. He was to come "in His Name," expounding the meaning and ever keeping afresh the memory of the words that they had heard Him speak. He was to open their minds, as they were able to bear it, to ever fresh depths in the treasures of wisdom and knowledge that were hid in the inexhaustible mystery of His Person. If we ask what may be inferred from that aspect of the work that the Comforter was to do for the disciples, with regard to the lessons which Jesus Himself had learnt from Him, we enter on a region in which we can only speak with the utmost reserve. Yet even here it may help us to remember that the Comforter, who comes to guide us into all the Truth, was with the Human Consciousness of Jesus to enable Him to hold communion with His Heavenly Father, and to apprehend those inner secrets of His Own Being which it was beyond the power of flesh and blood to reveal, taking the thoughts of the Father and showing them to the Son, that He might do what He saw the Father doing, and speak and judge only in accordance with the words that He heard from Him.

It is perhaps with the office and work of the Holy Ghost as Comforter that we may best connect the figure of "living

water," which our Lord chose on more than one occasion to represent the effect of the gift of the Spirit that He was empowered to bestow. With Him is the well of Life, and He alone can slake the infinite thirst of the souls of men for God.

The third title by which our Lord designates the Holy Spirit in His teaching is the "Spirit of the Truth." This title belongs, like the "Paraclete," exclusively in the Gospels to the Farewell Discourse. It occurs in the Epistles in 1 John iv. 6. The words of which it is composed are familiar, but it is not at all easy to bring out their full signification. "Truth," in our ordinary thought about it, is something abstract and impersonal. It is a vision of the inner meaning of the Universe, which a philosopher may hope to attain after a long search, but which he does not usually regard as striving on its side to make itself known to him. Or else it is a quality of a person, or of a thought, which we do not regard as having a spirit of its own. In fact, the phrase would be easier to understand if the terms were inverted. The Truthfulness of the Spirit is intelligible. And it would be an easy way out of the difficulty to say that the phrase is formed on a Hebrew model—*e.g.*, the "Sons of disobedience"—and means simply "the true Spirit." Certainly the Spirit of Truth makes a man true, as the Spirit of Wisdom makes him wise.

We should, however, miss a great deal if we acquiesced in this solution of the difficulty. It is good to know that the guide appointed for us is Himself truthful; and in the Old Testament the chief thought associated with the Truth of God is His faithfulness to His promises. Yet the title will mean far more to us if we fearlessly accept the guidance of the phrase as it stands, and take to heart the fact that the Truth, the ultimate Reality of the Universe, after which we are all seeking consciously or unconsciously, is not an impersonal enigma, but a living Being even more interested than we are in the success of our efforts to apprehend the revelation of Himself, which He is longing to impart. Then indeed, the title "Spirit of Truth" becomes full of significance for a loyal-hearted disciple. Our Lord's witnesses have, as their appointed task, to hold fast to their confession in the face of a hostile and unbelieving world. They have to withstand the specious allurements of the Spirit of Evil. But by their side is one, who comes to us from the very heart of the Truth Himself, to guide us to our goal: quick and active to open the eyes of our hearts to see Christ everywhere, commissioned to share with us the responsibility of bearing witness to Him in the world.

Some of this language may seem alarming to simple folk. We are not all conscious of any need of or any capacity for

philosophical discussions. Most Englishmen are quite content if they can find light on their daily path without probing further into the secrets of the Universe. But indeed such folk have no cause for fear. They are at once happier and wiser than they know. The secrets that are hidden from the wise and prudent are revealed to the babes of the Kingdom of Heaven. The man who has found, and knows that he has found, his true place and work in life has in his hands the key to unlock the whole.

Does this seem strange to us? It should not after our Lord's assurance; though it is wonderful that the simplest truth, the truth within the reach of the humblest, should be at once the deepest and the most universal. For what is this truth, the passport into the Kingdom of Heaven, the essential core and kernel of the Christian Creed? Is it not the acceptance in the heart and the confession with the mouth that Jesus is Lord? Any man who with that confession on his lips takes his place in the Body and finds himself a new creature in Christ has in himself the assurance that he has hold of something real. And the more he ponders on his own experience, and grasps the significance of the fact that what he has found to be true for himself is only true for him because it is true for all men, the deeper will grow his conviction that the reality with which he is in touch, the truth, of which it is more true to say that it has laid hold upon him than that he has laid hold of it, is for mankind universal and ultimate, and that here is the promise of the solution of all the problems, practical or intellectual, individual or social, by which we are beset.

He will see, at the same time, that the truth is a consecrating power, forcing a man to give up all claim to personal independence, and making of him a devoted servant of his Lord. So he will understand our Lord's parting prayer for His disciples, "Sanctify them in the Truth." The Spirit of Truth and the Spirit of Holiness are one and the same. If this is what the coming of the Spirit as the Spirit of Truth means to us, what shall we say of the coming of the same Spirit on the Lord at His Baptism? If we are right in accepting Baptism as a great venture of obedient faith on our Lord's part, the coming of the Spirit would, on the analogy of His relation to us, be for Him the verification of the correctness of His intuition, the assurance that the place to which He felt called, the one which He undertook to fulfil, was indeed the place and work appointed for Him by the Father. He was under no delusion when He claimed to be the Saviour of the world, the Sovereign Lord of the whole human race. So when at the close of His Ministry He stands before Pilate and is challenged touching His claim

to Kingship, He answers: "Thou sayest that I am a King: for this cause was I born, and for this cause have I come into the world, that I may bear witness to the truth." His assertion of His true position in the race is the key to His power to bring the unseen reality into manifestation before the minds and hearts of men.

That brings me to the end of my material. It remains briefly to sum up the results of my study of it.

The gospels then, as I read them, show how Jesus, when the time was ripe 1900 years ago, came in answer to the call of the Baptist to the banks of the Jordan ready to give Himself outright and altogether into the hands of God to work out what He had learnt from the Holy Scriptures to be His Father's will for the world. He came to fulfil the promise of His Name "Jesus" by becoming God's salvation to the ends of the earth. He undertook the rôle of "the Servant of the Lord." He came to make His life an offering for sin; and to pass to His throne over the hearts of men by the way of the Cross.

In the heart, so utterly surrendered to the task of revealing the Love of God in the service of man, the age-long seeking of the heart of man for God woke in "one unutterable moment" into the consciousness that its root was hidden deep in the yearning of the heart of God for just such a response from the heart of man.

That experience from the human side, from which alone we can approach it, marked the beginning of a new order of human experience, a new stage in the evolution, "creative" or "emergent," of the human race. It was marked by a conscious interpenetration of human personality by the Divine. The human spirit seeking its true home in the Eternal Reality was met by—found that it was itself responding to—a drawing from above. The Truth that it sought was seeking it. The human will, consecrating itself as the instrument of the divine Will, found that it was itself but the expression in time of an eternal element, a Spirit of Sonship which had been in communion with the Father in the ineffable unity of the Godhead before the creation of the world. The life that from that time forward He was called to live "in the flesh" became in consequence in the strictest sense no longer His life, but the life of His Father in Him as inspiring His words and as the real agent in all His works. And yet, of course, it remained all the time most truly His own life. He lost Himself to find Himself in God. From moment to moment he had to keep His spiritual ear open to hear what His Father was speaking. He had, as we are allowed to see in the final crisis in Gethsemane, to brace His Will to choose and do His Father's Will—and, as we learn from what He

taught the disciples to expect from the Comforter, He was conscious of a Presence and a Power with Him, quickening His apprehension, and keeping Him true to His purpose—the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of the knowledge and the fear of *God*.

That Spirit of Sonship inspiring and supporting His life of self-surrender, enabling His Will from moment to moment to see and to follow the guidance of the Will of His Heavenly Father, was none other than the "Spirit of Holiness" or "consecration" by which mankind must be possessed, if they are to be brought back to fellowship with God. It makes the Sovereignty of God a reality in the lives of men and so opens the Kingdom to them even while on earth. In consequence the whole of our Lord's public Ministry was an expression of His reaction to the presence with Him of the Holy Spirit. He preached the Gospel of the Kingdom of Heaven from within. The problem for us, if we are to take our part in carrying on the evangelization which He began, is to see how we can open our hearts to receive that Spirit from Him:

J. O. F. MURRAY.

THE HOLY TRINITY AND THE HISTORIC PROCESS

I. THE HOLY TRINITY AND COSMOLOGY

As soon as the world of our experience is made the object of philosophic thought two contrasts appear which clamour for attention. The first is the contrast between the actual and the possible; the second the contrast between permanence and change.

(a) The contrast between the actual and the possible has come in recent years very much to the front in modern philosophy, although the distinction between a realm of experience and a realm of ideas is at least as old as Plato. The materialistic-scientific philosophy of the last century tried to obliterate the distinction completely. It was claimed that a sufficient account could be given of the Universe by supposing it to consist of an aggregate of material particles moving under the direction of a few simply defined mathematical laws. As a matter of fact, even if this claim were true, it would still be necessary to account for the actual initial configuration of the particles at some arbitrarily chosen zero of time, and to explain why

the laws governing their motions should be those that were actually observed to hold rather than any one of the multiplicity of other laws which could, without any violation of logic, be equally easily imagined. But Victorian science, under the baneful shadow of Herbert Spencer, was content to ignore these awkward questions and to take the world of experience as a self-obvious axiomatic fact. In recent years, however, the breakdown of the materialistic theory has forced scientific philosophers to recognize the essential contingency, the "it-might-have-been-otherwiseness," of the Universe. Different scientists at the present day give us different models of the ultimate constitution of the physical world; but whether they correlate phenomena by the concepts of *q*-numbers, probability-waves, matrices, or what not, they are all agreed that the Universe that we experience possesses no logical necessity, and that the only thing that distinguishes it from an infinity of other equally thinkable systems is the bare fact that we experience *it* and do not experience *those*. (Professor Eddington's *Utopia** is a case in point.) The most ambitious attempt at a modern philosophy based on science which has yet been made is that which Professor Whitehead has elaborated over a period of many years, and which, heralded by various portions of his earlier works such as *Science and the Modern World*, has been given complete, if terrifying, form in the monumental volume *Process and Reality*. The fundamental thesis of this book is the distinction between the realm of possibility and that of actuality, between "eternal objects" and the "actual occasions" into which the eternal objects are ingredient; and its fundamental problem is to explain why it is that the eternal objects are ingredient into the actual occasions in the particular modes in which they *are* ingredient rather than in others which are logically equally possible. It would be presumptuous to attempt to apprise the value of Professor Whitehead's work, nor is it necessary here. The main point of importance for our purposes is the fact that Professor Whitehead can only account for the particular way in which our experience occurs by postulating the existence† of a "principle of concretion" whose function is to determine the actual way in which things happen. This principle he dignifies with the name of "God," though it is a very remote and pallid figure when compared with the fulness of truth and beauty and love to which the Christian applies that name. Also it has the startling property of being dependent on the world for its own existence. "It

* *Vide The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 265.

† If "existence" is the proper term to apply to that which is causally antecedent to what we ordinarily mean by existence.

is as true to say that God creates the world, as that the world creates God."* This dangerous pantheizing tendency is common to all forms of belief in a monhypostatic God; Bulgakoff, for example, remarks on its occurrence in the Arian controversy;† but it does not appear to be ineradicable from Professor Whitehead's treatment. Professor A. E. Taylor‡ has discussed how far Whitehead's treatment is satisfactory, and has suggested lines along which it might be modified to bring it into accord with the demands of the Christian Faith; all that we need here notice is the emphasis which modern scientific philosophy lays on the distinction between the possible and the actual and on the necessity of some principle of concretion, whose function it is, first to decide what is actually to occur, and then to bring this occurrence about.

(b) The second contrast is that between permanence and change, and it is well to note at the start that these two ideas of permanence and change, although they are often felt to be contradictory, are really both necessarily involved if experience is to occur at all. I can only say "A is permanent" if there is something, B, by whose change I can measure the passage of time. I can only say "X has changed" if, in some sense, X remained the same during the change; otherwise instead of having a *changing* X as the object of my experience I shall have two totally disparate entities X and Y with no causal connection between them. Like the first one, this contrast has come to be recognized as fundamental in modern philosophy. Whitehead's "actual occasions" are not mere static facts but are inherently self-creative. "The concrescence of each individual actual entity is internally determined and is externally free."§ Again, Eddington in *The Nature of the Physical World* stresses the importance of the concept of *becomingness* as essentially *sui generis* and irreducible.|| And both these thinkers are simply echoing in the realm of philosophy the indeterminacy (*i.e.*, undeterminedness by any *external* agency) which quantum-physics attributes to the intra-atomic processes.

In consequence, therefore, of these two contrasts we are presented with three fundamental and irreducible facts of experience which can be summarized as follows:

- (i.) There is an infinite realm of abstract possibility.
- (ii.) There is, selected from this realm, a limited realm of actual concrete occurrence.¶

* *Process and Reality*, p. 492.

† S. Bulgakoff, *Kupina Neopalimaya* (The Burning [lit. Unconsumed] Bush). Paris: Y.M.C.A. Press, 1927. Appendix III., pp. 261 sqq.

‡ In THEOLOGY, August, 1930, pp. 66 sqq.

§ *Process and Reality*, p. 37.

|| *Op. cit.*, chapter v.

¶ In the language of mathematical logic, this realm is a *sub-class* of the former.

(iii.) In contrast with the former realm, there is in this latter realm a process of change.

And all these three facts must be taken account of (it would perhaps be too much to say "explained") by any sound cosmology.

The suggestion which I wish to make is that these three facts are to be correlated with the cosmic functions of the three Persons of the Sacred Trinity. And, before examining the suggestion further, I would emphasize the word "cosmic" in the last sentence. We are not now concerned with the eternal social relationships that constitute the ineffable inner life of love of the triune Godhead. These latter must be for ever beyond our powers of comprehension, though we see them faintly mirrored in our experience of love. Nor are we considering that particular complex of relationships of the Divine Logos to the universe that constitutes the perfect humanity of the Incarnate Christ. We are concerned simply with those relationships of God to the created order by which He sustains the created order in being. And, again, we must remember that, while the specific functions of the three Persons can be distinguished, they cannot be separated. *Ubi Pater, ibi Filius et ibi Spiritus Sanctus*. God is, in relation to ὑπόστασις, three, but, in relation to οὐσία, one; and wherever and whenever one of the Persons acts, there and then the others act also each in His proper mode. The mutual interpenetration (*circumincessio*, περιχώρησις) of the Persons is not just a convenience of dialectic; it is, rightly understood, an eternal and absolute fact and our great safeguard against tritheism.

Credo in Unum Deum Patrem Omnipotentem, Factorem cœli et terræ, visibilium omnium atque invisibilium. . . . Et in Unum Dominum Jesum Christum . . . per quem omnia facta sunt. God the Father, the great Catholic Creed tells us, is the Maker of all things visible and invisible (πάντων ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων ποιητήν), and through God the Son all things came into being (δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο). No doubt many have felt that there is a confusion here, that the Creed attributes the same cosmic function of creation to both the Father and the Son; but as a matter of fact careful examination shows that the functions of the two Persons are kept perfectly distinct. The Father is the *Maker* of heaven and earth (*Factor*, ποιητής), and this term is not applied to the Son. *Through* the Son all things "came into being." This is the obvious force of ἐγένετο, and it is perhaps not without point to remark also that *facta sunt* is at least as much the active of *fio* as the passive of *facio*. Thus in the Creed itself there is a definite implication that,

while, in the last resort, everything, the possible and the actual alike, derives from the Father, the concrete existence of the actual as a fact in experience is the result of the peculiar activity of the Son. "Πάντων ὁρατῶν καὶ ἀοράτων" surely includes not merely what is actual in fact but what is possible in logic as well, while δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο clearly refers to the realm of concrete existence alone, as that which "came into being." We must not, of course, expect to find in the Creed a worked-out theology of creation, but it seems clear that the position to which the guidance of the Holy Spirit led the Church in the early centuries involves, at least implicitly, such a view as I have suggested above.

This has indeed been discussed at length by Dr. W. S. Bishop in a most illuminating article in THEOLOGY,* in which he contrasts the Eastern view of the "Trinity of origin" with the Western view of the "Trinity of self-consciousness." In the Eastern creeds, he says, "the point of departure is the affirmation of the 'one God the Father,'" while the Western confessions "make as their initial affirmation God as the 'Three in One.'" Again, "the Eastern group or family of creeds, find their point of departure in *the one God* (the Father), who eternally 'generates' the Son and from whom the Holy Spirit eternally 'proceeds,'" while to the West "it is *the Trinity* which is 'the one God.'" One might express this difference by saying that the Eastern mind is naturally attracted to a *monarchian* view of the Trinity and the Western to an *economic* view, without, however, implying that either view is formally incorrect. Rather is it the case that no one aspect under which the human mind can conceive the Blessed Trinity can exhaust the fulness of Its being. What is important for our purpose is to emphasize the truth in the Eastern view that, while the three Persons are essentially and ontologically one† and inseparable, yet the *source* of the Godhead, and so the source of all being, is the Eternal Father. As the Orthodox members of the Joint Doctrinal Commission insisted, there is only one αἰτία, one ἀρχή, in the Trinity, namely, God the Father.‡ The Son is θεὸς ἀληθινὸς and yet θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ. Dr. Bishop, indeed, traces this conception back to the New Testament itself, to St. Paul's words: "To us there is one God the Father, of whom are all things (ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα). . . and one Lord, Jesus Christ, by whom are all things (δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα). . . ."§ The subtle distinction between ἐκ and διὰ gives the exact shade of meaning required to bring out

* "Thoughts on the Blessed Trinity." June, July, 1929.

† Thus it has been said that the Persons are *tres*, not *tria*; *unum*, not *unus*.

‡ 1 Cor. viii. 6. Cf. John i. 3: πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο.

§ Report of the Joint Doctrinal Commission, p. 32. Cf. p. 73.

the difference in the cosmic functions of the Father and the Son, and the suggestion that I have tried to expound above is that this difference, when put in terms of modern philosophical conceptions, is simply the difference between Him who is the *ground* of all being, actual and potential, and Him who is the *active cause* in creation or, in Professor Whitehead's terminology, the *principle of concretion*.*

Let us agree then provisionally to associate the first two Persons of the Sacred Trinity with the first two of the three fundamental facts of experience which we tabulated earlier in this article. Can we associate the third one with God the Holy Spirit? Can we, that is, look upon the change, the spontaneity, the "becomingness" (to use Professor Eddington's phrase) of the universe as His special work? I believe that we can.

The Nicene† Creed tells us that the Holy Spirit is "the Lord the Giver of Life" (*Dominum et vivificantem, τὸ Κύριον τὸ ζοοποιὸν*)‡, and the essence of life, as we have come to learn especially in recent years, is spontaneity, change, process, adaptability, self-determination. And a most striking feature of modern science is that self-determination, which the Victorian materialistic *savant* denied even to human beings, is being attributed by present-day physicists to the ultimate elements of the physical universe, the atoms and their component electrons. The statement often made that modern physics endows the atom with "free-will" is perhaps an exaggeration, or at least an anthropomorphism; but the fact remains that such formulations of the basis of physics as the famous "principle of indeterminacy" or the even better-known "waves of probability"§ necessarily involve that even the processes that occur

* One may compare the beautiful phrase which I believe the Dean of St. Paul's has quoted in one of his books—"The Universe is a hymn sung by the Creative Logos to the glory of God the Father"—and the very clear statement in Fr. G. W. Carleton's excellent manual of Catholic instruction, *The King's Highway*: "God the Father made all things through God the Son, who is called the Word of God. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God; all things were made through him. As a word comes from a thought, so God the Son comes from God the Father; and as a thought is shown by a word, so all things were first in the mind of God the Father, and then were shown in creation by being made through the Son" (p. 8).

† Or rather the so-called "Niceno-Constantinopolitan" Creed. The Creed of the Nicene Fathers passes straight from *Kaì eis τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον* to the anathemas.

‡ The Rev. R. H. Moberly, in his Cambridge University sermon published in *THEOLOGY* of October, 1932, stresses the significance of the neuter *τὸ κύριον* (not the masculine *τὸν κύριον*) in the Creed as witnessing to the essential difference between the eternally *begotten* Son and the eternally *proceeding* Spirit. The Spirit is not another Son, still less a "Grandson," of the Father. He remarks that the Spirit is practically never represented in Christian art except under a purely symbolic form—as a dove, or fire, or wind.

§ An excellent popular exposition of these conceptions is given by Professor Eddington in chapter xi. of his Gifford Lectures on *The Nature of the Physical World*, 1928.

in what we describe as "dead matter" are shot through and through with the quality of novelty and spontaneity. This same fact appears in philosophical guise in Professor Whitehead's "Philosophy of Organism," according to which the ultimate units in nature are, as Professor Taylor puts it, "units of happening, not units of stuff,"* and in which, in the phrase quoted earlier in this paper, "the concrescence of each individual actual entity is internally determined and is externally free." It is therefore surely not fanciful to see the action of the Holy Spirit, no less than that of the Creative Logos, in every event of the world's history. *Life*, not necessarily as involving consciousness but in the sense of self-determined spontaneity, is not to be confined to certain elaborately organized configurations of matter, but is essential to all material existence. The life-giving activity of the Holy Ghost is present in every concrescence.† The Spirit of God breathes upon the face of the waters no less truly, though in immeasurably different degree, than He is present in the life of the greatest of God's saints. Creation is not as the Deists envisaged it, an isolated occurrence which happened once for all in the distant past; it is the never-ceasing act of love and power by which the triune Godhead from moment to moment sustains the world of our experience in being. And in this creative activity all the three Persons play their part. At the root of any actual occasion there is the cosmic function of the Eternal Father, the ground of all possibility of experience; superimposed on this, and resolving pure potentiality into the actuality of occurrence, there is the activity of the Divine Logos, the principle of "decision" and "concretion"; while the full character of the event as an element of the world-process is completed by the inbreathing of the Holy Spirit, which confers on it that quality of spontaneity or becomingness which makes it an actual factor in the causal process.

Thus the doctrine of the Sacred Trinity is entirely consonant with the requirements of modern cosmology. I do not mean by this that the doctrine can be proved from cosmological arguments. Christian thought has always realized that the doctrine is a "revealed" one which could not have been arrived at by the exercise of the unaided reason of man. It is none the less

* *Loc. cit., sup.*, p. 72.

† The function of the Holy Spirit as the source of the character of *novelty* in the world-process has been treated, from a very different standpoint to the above, by Professor G. P. Fedotoff of the Russian Theological Academy in Paris. In a most interesting paper, read first at the Anglo-Russian Student Conference in 1932 and published later in *The Christian East* (Spring, 1932), he examines the significance of the symbols under which the Holy Spirit has been envisaged—those of wind, fire, and dove. I am happy to believe that my conclusions are essentially in harmony with his. The whole of his article merits very careful study.

true that the doctrine, received as revealed, meets the needs of cosmology and so is verified at the bar of experience. And this is surely all that can be expected unless we are to deny the revealed character of the Faith altogether and exalt philosophy into the place of religion.

II. THE HOLY TRINITY AND HISTORY

We now proceed to the second part of our task, which is this: To outline an interpretation of the course of history on the basis of the above discussion. This will perforce be speculative rather than demonstrative; assertions will be made whose validity must be judged rather from their status as elements in a harmonious whole than from *ad hoc* proofs in each particular case. But I believe that it will be found possible to give, from the above view-point, an account of the historical process which will be of value as bringing out fully its essential purposiveness and as giving an enhanced insight into the destiny of man.

We will start, then, from the fundamental assumption that the Eternal Trinity, out of the fulness of divine love, created man so that love could be poured out to the utmost.* It would perhaps be more accurate to say "creates" than "created," for, as we have seen, creation is not an isolated act performed once and for all at the beginning of time, but is a continuous activity of the triune Godhead enduring in every event of the spatio-temporal process. Viewing this process from a purely natural point of view, its climax came with the appearance of man. Whether we adhere to the extremist Daytonian fundamentalism or whether, with the majority of modern Christians, we are ready to accept the teaching of biologists that man, in so far as his animal nature is concerned, is the last stage in a complicated evolutionary process, we can agree on this. The course of pre-human history, whether it occupied five days of twenty-four hours each or thousands of millions of years, was the product of the creative activity of the triune God, and was directed towards the production of a being capable of

* I make no attempt to explain *how* the transcendent self-existence of the Godhead is compatible with His "going forth" from Himself in the act of creation. This problem is, of course, at the base of the controversy between idealism and realism (in the modern senses of those terms). It also formed the philosophical, as distinct from the ecclesio-political, ground of the fourteenth-century Palamite controversy, in which a solution was attempted by contrasting the divine *ousia* and *energeia*. This has been related to modern categories of thought by the Russian sophiological school in Paris, especially by Professor S. Bulgakoff. The only work of his on the subject that has been translated is *Person and Personality* (*Ipostas' i ipostasnost'*), the English version of which exists in typescript and which is a scholium to his great work *The Light that Never Sets* (*Svyet nevecherny*, Moscow, 1917).

moral response, in whom the outward-flowing love of God, manifested in the very existence of the created realm, could return to Him in an act of adoring self-surrender offered by man the summit and epitome of creation.

It will be well to mention in passing two much-debated questions which are connected with this matter.

The first is that of the origin of sin. The older view definitely attributed the existence of moral disorder in the material realm to the action of man alone, to—

“man’s first disobedience and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree, whose mortal taste
Brought death into the world and all our woe.”

Evolutionary theory has tended to modify this view, for it seems difficult to deny that there was evil in the world even prior to the emergence of man. Thus we find Dr. N. P. Williams in *The Theory of the Fall and Original Sin* producing in a new guise the theory of a pre-cosmic fall, and the Bishop of Bloemfontein in *Evolution and Redemption* teaching a theory according to which a wrong turn was taken in the course of evolution in the pre-human period. For our purposes, however, the origin of moral disorder is not of great moment. What matters is the fact that, from whatever cause, the free return of love for love, which became possible with the appearance on earth of a self-conscious moral being, was not made. It is this alone that we shall assume below.

The second of these incidental questions is one which played a large part in the Thomist-Scotist controversies of the Middle Ages—the question as to whether, if the world had not fallen, the Divine Logos would have become incarnate. It is largely an academic point, for all that really matters is that the world *did* fall and that God the Son *was* made man. It does, however, seem difficult to believe that so overwhelming a manifestation of the love of God as is involved in the Incarnation was the result of something, namely the Fall, which ought never to have happened. Of course, if the world had never fallen, the conditions of the Incarnation must have been enormously different from what they actually were. There would have been no need for atonement, and so no need for the Passion and Death of our Lord. One might venture to suggest that if, as soon as the course of evolution had produced a being capable of moral response to the love of God, response had actually been made, the response itself might have provided the means through which the Divine Logos could have taken human nature upon Himself, and the long preparation of the Jewish nation as the medium in which the new creation could be initiated

would have been unnecessary. This is, however, pure speculation. In whatever way it occurred, and whatever would have happened had it not occurred, the Fall did occur in fact, and the subsequent history of the world is, from the Christian standpoint, simply the story of what God did and is doing to annul its effects. As a consequence of the Fall the atoning death of the God-man became a necessity. To use the language of human feelings, we might say that the reaction of the Godhead to the Fall was a passionate longing for the Divine Logos to become incarnate so that the Fall might be undone. The tragedy was, however, that the separation between God and man which the Fall had introduced made the Incarnation at that stage impossible. If, as has been suggested, the emergence of a being with a power of moral response to the love of God gave just the link between creation and the Creator through which He might have become incarnate in it, the lack of that response (and indeed its very antithesis, rebellion) must have broken the link and thwarted God's purpose. If the Incarnation was ever to come about now that the Fall had occurred, it could only be after a long period of preparation and development in human history under the guidance of the hidden working of God.

The *præparatio evangelica* which is the history of the Jewish nation is thus the first stage in God's undoing of the Fall. Viewing the world from outside, as it were, we see the Sacred Trinity waiting, in that most divine of all qualities patience, for the moment when the world would again be fit, albeit in the purity of but one single woman, for God to enter into it by becoming man. All through the centuries the Holy Spirit was waiting for one who could be His bride; all through the centuries the Divine Son was yearning for a human mother; and in the bosom of the Eternal Father there was the deep longing that, through union with His ever-begotten Son, the world should return to sonship with Him. Human words are pitifully helpless here, but they are all that we have to use. Perhaps it does not matter that our language is anthropomorphic if we remember its limitations. There seems no other way of expressing the effect that the Fall had upon God than to say that He was longing to become man and yet could not do so.

This is a view of the case as it were from above, from outside the world-process. From within, from the standpoint of fallen man, these same facts take on a different aspect, just as a house looks different when viewed from the inside. This longing of God, when seen from within the created order, constitutes the gradual process by which the never-ceasing divine creativity prepared a dwelling-place for the Eternal Son. The concrete

function of the Logos and the directive life-giving activity of the Spirit, working on the background of the illimitable possibility whose ground is the Father, combine in the stupendous transformation of the Hebrew people from its early beginnings as an obscure and primitive Semitic tribe, through the purgation of its tribulations and the moral ardour of the prophets, to the final ethical monotheism which provided the setting in which at last there could be born a woman in whom human nature was again near enough to the divine ideal for the Everlasting God to unite humanity to Himself in her womb.

The yearning of God transcendent for incarnation had been met by the working of God immanent in the course of history; yet the transcendent and the immanent are but the two sides of one supreme fact of love. In the reply of our Lady to the angel's message the *præparatio evangelica* attained its completion.

Ecce ancilla domini, fiat mihi secundum verbum tuum. Blessed indeed was she among women, who heard the word of God and did it.

"The zone where two glad worlds for ever meet
Beneath that bosom ran;
Deep in that womb the conquering Paraclete
Smote Godhead on to man."*

If we may say so with reverence, God's opportunity had come; and He made use of it. "Whenas all the world was in profoundest quietness, and night was in the midst of her swift course, thine almighty Word, O Lord, leaped down from heaven out of thy royal throne."† When the Divine Child began to take form in the womb of the Blessed Virgin, the new creation was begun. Our Lady was the crown of the old creation; our Lord the source of the new. Her conception, immaculate though it may have been, was but the climax of the working of God in the natural order; His was the result of the direct interposition of the Holy Spirit in the fulness of time. She is the focus upon which the whole course of pre-Christian history converged; He is the focus from which the whole course of post-Christian history radiates. And because she is the Mother who bore Him in her womb, these two foci blend into union in the supreme moment when she conceived Him through the operation of the Holy Ghost. In that incredible event of human history, when the Angels burst from heaven with songs of joy, creation received its reconciliation and its potential glorification, and all that has happened in the world since then is simply the story of how that glorification, furthered by sanctity

* R. S. Hawker, *Aishah Shechinah*.

† Introit for Sunday after Christmas.

and stayed by sin, is gradually passing from potentiality to realization in actual fact.

The position taken up by some modern theologians who teach that our Lord was nothing but the unique and supreme product of the working of God from within the course of history, is thus entirely accurate except for one defect. It is a description not of our Lord but of His blessed Mother. It is she who is the best and holiest to which a fallen race indwelt by God immanent could give rise; it is she who is, in Wordsworth's phrase,

"Our tainted nature's solitary boast."

But in the God-man Jesus of Nazareth we see not the mere climax of God immanent working in the world, but the result of the direct action of God *ab extra* in His transcendence. The stanza quoted above from R. S. Hawker's poem expresses this with more point and adequacy than could any description in prose. In the conception of our Lord by His blessed Mother through the overshadowing of the Holy Ghost there took place, for the first time in human history, the meeting and the interpenetration of two worlds—the spatio-temporal world of the created order, and the eternal world wherein dwells the ineffable triune God.

"The zone where two glad worlds for ever meet
Beneath that bosom ran."

As the course of human history from the Fall to the Incarnation converged upon the Conception of the Divine Logos, so the whole of history subsequent to that stupendous fact broadens out from it in the missionary activity of the Catholic Church. Once manhood had been united to the Godhead in Jesus of Nazareth the union of all men with God was possible, not of course in the sense that the hypostatic union could ever be repeated, but because Manhood had been so purged and purified through the hypostatic union that it was once again capable of receiving that glorification and transfiguration for which its Maker designed it. Post-Christian history is simply the as yet unfinished story of the gradual incorporation of individual men and women into the divine humanity. I have tried in a previous article* to elucidate this conception and to bring out the significance of St. Paul's teaching that the Church is the Body of Christ; this cannot be recapitulated here. What has been said above may, however, be of some little use as an attempt, admittedly tentative and imperfect and possibly in some points erroneous, to outline the fundamentals of a Christian philosophy of world-history in terms of the conceptions of modern thought.

E. L. MASCALL.

* In THEOLOGY, April, 1931, pp. 203 *seq.*, especially p. 211. Cf. also articles in the issues of December, 1929, and September, 1930.

MISCELLANEA

NOTES AND COMMENTS

THROUGH the death of Dr. Armitage Robinson the Church of England, and indeed the Church of all lands, loses one of its ripest scholars and most wise theologians. His researches and writings were many and varied; but pride of place must be given to his Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians. It may well be called a perfect commentary; and the fact that generations of clergy have been, and will be, brought up on it is perhaps the best of all tributes that could be paid to his work. May he rest in peace.

Among contributors to the present issue, the Rev. Austin Farrer is of St. Edmund's Hall, Oxford, and contributes for the first time. Dr. J. O. F. Murray was for many years Master of Selwyn; and the Rev. E. L. Mascall, whose articles have often appeared in these pages, is an assistant curate in South London.

We are glad to draw attention to two devotional books, recently published, which are of more than usual helpfulness and charm. One is *The Secret of the Saints* (Heffer, 2s. 6d.), by Sir Henry Lunn, a little volume whose 220 pages are stored with the sound teaching and happy illustration of one who has devoted a lifetime to the study of Meditation and Prayer. The other is a Manual of Praise, Prayer, and Meditation, entitled *The Way of Light*, and compiled by Dr. Howard Chandler Robbins, formerly Dean of New York; an anthology of good things culled from many sources, and well arranged.

CORRESPONDENCE

DEAR SIR,

No one who knows Mr. Dunlop could imagine that his letter was intended to be "quarrelsome"; but I am not sure that it is perfectly just. Let me acknowledge that in this matter of the Elevation there is a real *temptation* to subordinate ritual to ceremonial, and that such subordination is always wrong. Thus it seems to me that there is no place for the Elevation in, e.g., the Scottish rite. Let me acknowledge also that I think that the English Church would have been ill-advised to exchange its "Western" method of Consecration for an "Eastern" one. This is not so much because I think one any better than the other, but because such a change would inevitably mean a jar to devotional feeling and habit. This jar would have to be expressed, logically, by the omission of the Elevation. But the objection which I made to the canon of 1928 was quite different. It seems to me that it is a very grave thing to introduce any change in the method of Consecration without the fullest authority; and that the ambiguity of the proposed method makes it worse, and not better. In this objection I am perfectly sincere; and I do not see why I should let Mr. Dunlop lead me up the garden of the Unconscious by his suggestion that I am merely rationalizing my real hankering after the authentic savour of Latinism.

Yours faithfully,

KENNETH D. MACKENZIE.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique.

The April number opens with a consideration of the inland pilgrims who travelled to Rome by way of the Rhine in the Middle Ages. Its author, Father Gougoud, studied in 1908 the wanderings of the Irish on the Continent, and out of this study has sprung the present one. The routes taken by him seem at first sight to be byroads, and yet as we finish his illuminating article we come to the conclusion that they are frequently main ones. Father de Lacger examines in general the Albigenses during the crisis of this heresy, and in particular the episcopate of Guilhem Peire (1185-1227). This is the first instalment of what will evidently be a real contribution to this much-investigated subject. Father Mollat writes highly significant notes on the right of spoils in days gone by. He particularly applies his conclusions to ecclesiastical property during the vacancy of benefices. He has much to say on the dominium of the feudal superior on the one hand and on the dominium of the Pope on the other. He draws attention to papal ordinances, notably that of Clement VI., regulating the practice of spoils before 1345. Father de Poorter gathers information contained in a *Book of Hours and of Prayers* found in a library of Bruges. Father Philippen deals with the country and the episcopate of S. Rombaut. In noting the origins of the States of the Low Countries, Father Lousse is specially strong on questions of procedure. Father Lefevre examines the stay of the Brabançon mystic, John of Ruysbroek, at Brussels.

R. H. MURRAY.

Jewish Quarterly Review, vol. xxiii., No. 4.

Professor Solomon Skoss gives an interesting account of some fragments of an unpublished and hitherto but little known philological work of Saadiah (A.D. 892-942). This important work, of which it is hoped the remaining fragments will come to light, represents the earliest known attempt at writing a Hebrew grammar.

Norman Bentwich in a useful article collects information from Christian and pagan sources as to the persecution of Jews in the second century A.D.

Dr. H. G. Enelow writes on recent finds of MSS. of the Midrash of R. Eliezer. These seem to give the complete words, of which the Baraita formed only a part. The importance of this discovery seems chiefly to lie in the fact that the sources of many passages in mediæval Hebrew literature are now for the first time disclosed.

Professor Henry J. Cadbury reviews Robert Eisler's much discussed book, *The Messiah Jesus and John the Baptist*, which has more than once been referred to in our columns. Cadbury aptly remarks: "Parts of Eisler read like the vagaries of Drews or W. B. Smith. . . . Yet everywhere there is abundance of careful learning and scientific method. It is a rather baffling combination."

R. D. MIDDLETON.

REVIEWS

THE BEGINNINGS OF CHRISTIANITY. Part I.: The Acts of the Apostles. Vols. iv. and v. Macmillan and Co. 25s. each.

The first thing that strikes the reader of these volumes is their portentous size. It is difficult to avoid the feeling that they might have been reduced without disadvantage. Vol. iv. consists of an English translation with notes. The translation on the whole is excellent, though we must protest against the pedantry and inaccuracy of translating *οὐρανός* as "sky." No doubt to the early Church "heaven" was a place, but it was a place above the firmament, not in it. On the other hand, the value of a translation in a work of this type is a little doubtful; the notes would be meaningless to a reader who has no Greek; the reader who can translate for himself hardly needs a translation.

The notes, again, would benefit considerably by a drastic curtailment. Guide-book details as to the localities mentioned in Acts are not needed. Still more out of place in a modern commentary are highly dogmatic comments on the relation of particular passages to current theological controversy. Such comments only excite suspicion as to the scientific impartiality of the commentator. Ideally it ought to be impossible to tell from such a work whether the writer believes in the Christian religion or not, or in what form of it he believes; here we are left in no such doubt, and it is easy to see how the bias of the editors has affected their views. Incidentally on p. 8 the note: "Few modern hypotheses have less ancient testimony in their favour than that miracles were not intended as evidence" is gravely misleading in a work on Christian origins, unless it is qualified by a distinction between the attitude of Jesus Himself in this respect and that of the disciples. Few things are so remarkable as the preservation in the Gospels of His refusal to work signs apart from faith, as against the passion of primitive Christianity for pure thaumaturgy.

A similar bias betrays itself in the introduction of doubts as to the accuracy of the narrative, which are purely fantastic, but serve to create an atmosphere of suspicion. Thus Mr. Montefiore's view is mentioned that St. Paul cannot have been a Pharisee, since the essence of the religion of the Pharisees was that repentance, not the observance of the letter of the Law, was the one thing needful. We have no desire to speak of Mr. Montefiore with anything but respect, but such a view is purely fantastic. Professor Foot Moore expresses the attitude of the Pharisees

when he writes: "Obedience to God's law in its entirety is the supreme *moral* obligation of man, irrespective of the subject matter of the particular article" (*Judaism*, ii. 7). It is quite possible that St. Paul was unjust to the Pharisaic point of view, just as Luther may have been unjust to medieval Catholicism. But we cannot argue that Luther cannot have been brought up in medieval Catholicism in view of the difference between his view of it and the *Imitatio Christi*. Or, to take a smaller instance, we might well have been spared the doubt expressed in the note on Acts xxvii. 30 as to St. Paul's wisdom in interfering with the management of the dinghy; crews have had panics before now and St. Paul was not without experience of shipwreck. After all, he was on the spot, and the suggestion that he may have been wrong is the kind of futility which brings criticism into disrepute.

Judicious omissions on these lines would have added enormously to the value of these two volumes. But the excessive scepticism they express is characteristic of the whole outlook of the commentary. It has usually been held that Acts is intended to illustrate the gradual diffusion of the Gospel from the Jews of Palestine to those of the Dispersion in Jerusalem, thence to the Samaritans and so to the Gentiles. In any case, the narrative of Pentecost falls outside this scheme, but it is clear that here the compiler of Acts is faced with a narrative which will not fit into it. The editors on the whole deal with this narrative rather unsuccessfully. They omit *κατοικοῦντες Ἰουδαῖοι*, perhaps rightly, and recognize that the incident is intended to be read as a reversal of the curse of Babel and of the supposed rejection of the Law by the nations when it was accepted by the Jews; but they do not really face the question of the supposed "other tongues." The difficulty is to see how any one could have supposed that the nations represented spoke more than four languages at most. Nor can I believe that the mysterious "Cretans and Arabians" are genuine; they seem quite obviously added by a stupid editor on the strength of Gal. i. 17 and Titus i. 5. It is playing with words to suggest that Cretans "represents" the "extreme" of the West which is "not covered by the previous names."

Apart from this, the usual view of Acts is entirely contested by the editors. We are told that there is no evidence for the use of "Hellenists" to refer to Jews of the Dispersion (possibly but not necessarily speaking Greek) apart from Acts. This is true, but there is clear evidence that "Hebrew" means something more than an "Israelite" in Phil. iii. 5 and 2 Cor. xi. 22. We know that native-born Jews looked down on those born abroad, and the appearance of a "proselyte of Antioch" suits

this scheme. But the editors will have none of this. The Hellenists (in spite of Professor Nock's warning letter) must be Gentiles, so that we may be delivered from overestimating St. Luke's skill. There were Gentiles in Jerusalem who might have been converted; the mention of the proselyte at the end may be an accident. And the Hellenists to whom St. Paul preaches in Jerusalem again may well have been Gentiles. Now all this involves a whole series of *ad hoc* explanations. After all, Jerusalem was not a commercial centre, but a Holy City: Gentiles were no doubt to be found there, but not, one would imagine, in large numbers. Still less were they likely to be interested in a queer Jewish sect. St. Stephen preached to a synagogue (or synagogues) of Jews from the Dispersion, but this is a mere accident. And St. Paul preached to the Gentiles in Jerusalem: but why they sought to kill him is not explained. Here, as in dealing with the incident of Aretas at Damascus, it is assumed that St. Paul was likely to get into trouble with Gentile authorities: "Acts itself is witness that constituted authority rarely tolerated the Apostle for a longer time" than a year. Now this is a complete misrendering of Acts, which, whether true or not, represents constituted authority as tolerating St. Paul indefinitely, when it was Gentile authority; it is only at the instigation of the Jews that constituted authority refuses to tolerate him. The difficulties between St. Paul and Aretas are magnified into a contradiction between Acts and 2 Corinthians which does not really exist. *Pace* Dr. Lake, it is much easier to catch your man if you watch the gates of a city as well as conducting an illegal house-to-house visitation, and there is no reason why, if the "ethnarch" was outside the city, the Jews should not arrange with him to seize St. Paul; if Damascus was really under Roman control, it would be the best way of preventing him from appealing to Roman protection.

Similarly we are told that St. Philip appealed to the Messianic belief of the Samaritans, but his converts may well have been made among the Gentiles of Samaria, as the subsequent history of Simon Magus and his heresy suggests that he was of Gentile rather than Samaritan origin. But the identity of the local conjurer of Acts viii. is assumed by Professor Casey with a rather startling simplicity (otherwise the note on the heresy of Simon Magus is an admirable piece of work). And it is highly improbable that the Gentile population of Samaria would have been interested in any Messianic doctrine at all. Moreover, we are finally left with no explanation of the reason for the explosion of Jewish-Christian opposition over the affair of Cornelius.

Finally, by the identification of the "Famine-visit" of

Acts xii. with the Council-visit of Acts xv. we are left with a complete chaos. But in spite of Lightfoot, there is no reason for identifying the two. The persons involved are the same, but any controversy between the churches of Jerusalem and Antioch would have involved the same personages. The history of the Council as given by St. Luke is perfectly intelligible as the final stage in a sporadic controversy of some years' duration; the editors miss the whole point by failing to see that the demand of the Pharisee-converts is essentially different from that of the ordinary Judaizers; it is a demand for that intensification of legal observance which was one of the reasons for the popularity of the public ministry of our Lord. The later rabbis reflect a stage in which popular Judaism has been abolished, but it is clearly to be seen in the Gospels and the Acts; it is not the law, but the Pharisaic observance of the law that is to St. Peter "a yoke which neither we nor our fathers were able to bear."

We cannot help feeling that this excessive scepticism is based far more on certain presuppositions of the editors than on the real difficulties of the narrative. The fact that so many different *ad hoc* explanations are needed to diminish its face value is fairly clear evidence that the simpler view of more conservative critics is nearer the truth. Of course, St. Luke is not a scientific modern historian, as indiscreet admirers have sometimes claimed. But no ancient writer was a scientific historian in the modern sense. Like all others, he is a chronicler of selected episodes chosen with an eye to their dramatic value and their bearing on his main theme. He often omits episodes either because they are unedifying or because they seemed unimportant. Thus he makes no allusion to the controversies between St. Paul and the Church of Corinth; his motive may have been the suppression of an unedifying story, but it may also have been a quite genuine belief that the whole affair was not of permanent importance. After all, the whole matter seems to have been settled in a few months, and the general attitude of the Corinthian converts does not appear to have found imitators in other Churches. Naturally, if we approach such a writer from the point of view of a counsel for the prosecution, we shall find plenty of discrepancies and omissions, the more so when we are dealing with a writer who is entirely indifferent to the movements of his minor characters. Thus the discrepancy between Acts and Thessalonians as to the movements of Silas and Timothy are worked up into a complete mystification, whereas the obvious fact is that St. Luke is entirely indifferent to them between St. Paul's departure from Berea and their arrival at Corinth, which leads St. Paul for some reason to decide on a mission to Corinth rather than a return to Syria.

We fear that all this treatment of the narrative reveals a serious lack of historical imagination; it is a defect which meets us at many other points. Thus we are told that Judas of Galilee and Theudas were not Messianic impostors but mere rebels against Rome. Such a view ignores the meaning of λέγων εἶναι τινα ἑαυτὸν in the speech of Gamaliel and the claim of Theudas to lead his followers miraculously across Jordan. But still more it involves a complete failure to understand the historical probabilities of the situation. Given a Messianic expectation of deliverance from oppressors in a nation filled with political and religious discontent, any leader of a revolt would tend to be regarded as a possible Messiah and to claim to be "somebody" who might prove to be the Messiah. The later Messianic faith of the rabbis is no safe guide to the popular excitements of the first century with its "false Christs who deceive many." Similarly the treatment of the story of the "communistic" experiment of the first disciples shows a complete failure to understand the outlook of enthusiastic religious movements, which almost invariably do run to short-lived experiments in communism. It is surprising that Americans should fail to recognize this, even if, as theologians, they forget the Essenes.

It will be seen that the historical treatment of Acts is open to serious criticism. With the treatment of the theology we have far less quarrel. Quite frequently the authors remember that we are dealing with a movement founded on immediate experience and rationalizing itself as it goes along. At such times they give us much valuable information; at other times they become seriously misleading. We are more than grateful for the suggestion that the correct translation of Acts xx. 28 is "through the blood of His Own," τοῦ ἰδίου being a variation of μονογενῆς or ἀγαπητός, as against the impossible developed and slightly patripassian Christology of "His own blood" or the palpable emendation τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ. On the other hand, St. Paul's statement "the Spirit is the Lord" is treated as a sort of proof-text for the view that St. Paul identified Jesus with the Holy Spirit, instead of an incidental attempt to harmonize the experience of "being in the Spirit" with the experience of "being in Christ." Again, the treatment of baptism in the Acts is marred by a naïve assumption that the book can be treated as a baptismal register of the early Church; one has a suspicion that the language of Acts xviii. 8 that Crispus believed and that many of the Corinthians believed and were baptized might have served as a foundation for an elaborate theory on baptism but for 1 Cor. i. 14. There are certainly problems as to the development of Christian baptism and the

process by which it became universal, but it is only complicated by holding that the omission of its mention is necessarily evidence that a particular convert was not baptized. Similarly the treatment of the giving of the Holy Ghost suffers from a failure to recognize that it is usually only mentioned in cases where there was a doubt as to the possibility of the convert being received (the Samaritans and Cornelius), or some similar need of the gift for evidential purposes (the disciples of the Baptist).

But we could write a volume as large at least as one of the two before us without exhausting the points on which we disagree with the general attitude of these volumes. We prefer to turn to the solid merits which are to be found in them. They are crammed with masses of invaluable information and references. The additional notes in vol. v. deserve special commendation. Professor Nock gives us one of his all too rare banquets of learning on the subject of Elymas the Magian; it may not all be relevant to the incident at Paphos, but we would not go without it for worlds. Dr. Kirsopp Lake is good on the "God-fearers" of Acts, who are not to be regarded as a technical class of outer adherents of the synagogue, though in fact the term is often used to include such loose adherents; unfortunately the last section of this note which sets out to deal with the possible existence of syncretistic sects, partly Jewish and partly pagan, fails at the critical point. The Bosphorus inscriptions as quoted do not necessarily imply that there was any syncretistic sect at all, only that both Jews and pagans used the phrase *ὑψίστος* of God. In fact, the existence of such sects, except for the "Hypsistarians" of Cappadocia, remains unproved; the *cælicolæ* of Africa are surely the votaries of the *Cælestis Dæmon* of Salvian, whom Christians worshipped secretly, but without syncretizing her with their Christianity. On the other hand, the evidence for the adaptation of Hellenistic ideas by the Judaism of the Dispersion is ignored in this note as it is also in the discussion of the term "Saviour" in Dr. Cadbury's note on "The Titles of Jesus in Acts." It is not paganism which introduces the concept of the *σωτήρ* or *ἀρχηγός* into Christianity, but the usage of the synagogue in its attempts to show that Jehovah is the true Saviour or that the heroes of the O.T. are the true *ἀρχηγοί*. The concluding section of Philo, *De Vit. Moys.* 2, and Josephus' narrative of the Exodus, are the clue to the problem of Jewish-Hellenistic syncretism, if not to its solution. Again, in this note we see a distinctly tendentious desire to avoid the admission that the titles of "servant of God," "the Righteous One" are references to the prophecy of Isa. liii. It is not that other explanations cannot be found

in each case, but that so many are required, and some of them so far-fetched, while the significance of St. Paul's avoidance of this prophecy is overlooked. On the other hand, Dr. Cadbury's note on the speeches in Acts is admirable: we entirely agree with their "Thucydidean" character (those who regard them as literal reproductions omit to explain their brevity), while he recognizes that they preserve valuable data for the reconstruction of the Christology of the primitive Church. The same writer is far less successful in his note on "Roman Law and the Trial of Paul." There would seem to be a bad blunder on p. 311, where Mommsen is quoted as holding that after appeal to Rome (*nach eingelegter Provocation*) the procurator could not pronounce a judgment even of acquittal; Dr. Cadbury interprets this as meaning that "a final judgment in Paul's case was never really in the hands either of Felix or Festus." The same note refers to "popular writers like Sir William Ramsay," an unfortunate phrase, and inconsistent with the respect with which this eminent scholar is usually treated in this work. Have we here an indication that the commentary has not received a final revision from the compiler? The real weakness of the whole note is its assumption that the theory of Roman Law was always strictly observed in the provinces, whereas we have ample evidence to the contrary in contemporary literature. St. Luke probably had no technical legal knowledge; it is certainly an exaggeration of his merits to attempt to prove anything of the kind; but the account of the trials at Jerusalem and Cæsarea are probably as accurate as an account by a lay witness of the proceedings in an English court would be.

Of the rest of the notes we would specially commend Professor Casey's on Simon Magus, already noticed (but is his "descent through the spheres" connected with Valentinian teaching and not rather part of the common outlook of pre-Valentinian Gnosticism?), and on the term *μάγντος* in the New Testament, those on Artemis of Ephesus and the Asiarchs by Dr. Lily Ross Taylor, and on the policy of Rome to the Jews by Dr. Vincent Scramuzza. Dr. Scramuzza should really have saved the commentators from the blunder of supposing that the right of extradition of Jewish malefactors to Jerusalem, provided in the original alliance between Judæa and Rome, continued when Judæa was a province; Josephus' statement (*B.J.*, I., 24, 2) that Herod the Great enjoyed this right as an exceptional privilege is decisive to the contrary.

There is a very weak note on "the Name, Baptism, and the Laying-on of hands," which makes the almost ritual assumption that we trace in the use of the Name of Jesus in the N.T. the

"magical" idea of the efficacy of the Name without reference to the LXX use of the "name" of God, when, in fact, the Name was being disused, and completely ignores the *locus classicus* of Origen (c. *Cels.*, v. 45). There are excellent notes on the Roman Army (Dr. T. S. Broughton), the Chronology of Acts (Dr. Kirsopp Lake), and numerous other points, including the winds of the Mediterranean and the "undergirding" of ships.

We have already noticed one instance where the final revision of the "compiler" seems to have failed; it is by no means the only one. Thus on p. 99 of vol. v. we are told that Josephus believes that the world is full of invisible beings, who may be good or bad, because they are the souls of dead men, the wicked becoming devils, the good heroes; in either case the "stuff" of which they are made is the same; it is "soul" or "spirit." Yet some ten lines later we read that though Josephus was not as opposed to Greek thought as the rabbis, he had learnt little from the Greeks in theological matters. Again, on p. 293 of vol. iv. we are told that "forty miles, the distance of Antipatris from Jerusalem, is a quite impossible night march for infantry," but on p. 295 we learn that the site of Antipatris has not been identified. One has every sympathy with the compilers of so large a work, since it is not an easy matter to remove inconsistencies, but at any rate they should not be allowed to occur in such close proximity. And modern facilities of composition make it easier for us than it was for the ancient.

None the less we trust that we have made it clear that in spite of their failings the two volumes are of the utmost value to the student of Christian origins; they are packed with valuable information, and even where we disagree with their answer to the questions they raise, they show what the questions are. They remind us of a museum filled with interesting specimens arranged by a curator with a number of extravagant theories. The theories are often irritating and wrong-headed, but they do not diminish the interest and value of the specimens.

W. L. KNOX.

THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONALISM: A Study in International Relations through the Ages. By Norman Bentwich. London: George Allen and Unwin.

This is a deeply impressive book, and every Christian minister and thoughtful Christian layman is strongly recommended to read it. It is at once packed with matter and inspired by an almost prophetic fervour. The author (whom the reviewer remembers at Cambridge as scholar of Trinity, a brilliant student of international law and also an accomplished musician),

after a distinguished administrative career in Egypt and Palestine, is now Weizman Professor of the International Law of Peace in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The book represents the inaugural course of lectures delivered by him in 1932 in that capacity. Speaking as a Jew to Jews in the age-long spiritual capital of his race, he naturally writes from the point of view of his own creed and is specially concerned to emphasize the part that may be played by his race—described by him as “most European and most Asiatic, the most dispersed and most concentrated of peoples, at once . . . enterprising and tenacious, realist and idealistic”—in furthering the cause of world-peace. But there is no trace of narrowness in his outlook. He starts from the position that “all varieties of religious belief are as necessary and as healthy as varieties of national culture,” and that “there is something true and divinely revealed about every world-religion.” He also maintains, and proves with abundance of illustration, that the great world religions, in their authentic form and in so far as they have not been corrupted by human weakness and human sin, have in almost every case stressed the universal aspects of humanity and called men to cultivate peace and goodwill. And from this point of view he invites all religions to co-operate today in bringing about that moral revolution which can alone make the brotherhood of nations a reality. “The League of Nations is today a body without a soul: and this soul may be nourished by a spiritual league.” Only in the power of religion, he believes, can the unbridled forces of nationalism that produced the Great War and (despite its bitter experience) are still rampant today both in West and East be brought under control, and the ideal of Mazzini be realized that “humanity is the association and alliance of peoples to work out their mission in peace and love.”

To a Christian the book is not altogether comfortable reading. “In the past,” says Mr. Bentwich, “the Eastern religions have been a more effective influence for peace than the Western.” The Catholic Church, at the period of its greatest power, showed itself tragically forgetful alike of the social doctrine inherited by Christianity from the Hebrew prophets and of the pacific ideals that inspired its Divine Founder and His early followers. It is possible, indeed, that Mr. Bentwich represents the Christians of the first three centuries as more completely subdued to the doctrine of non-resistance than they actually were. There is evidence of conflicting views on this point. But no serious student of history will quarrel with his indictment of the change which, after Constantine, subordinated the principles of the Gospel to the spirit of Roman imperialism and the warlike instincts of the Teutonic peoples—

with the result that "the Christian religion has been more often a factor for war than for peace." The Great War proved that even in our own time this attitude of mind is far from extinct. Yet, as Mr. Bentwich gladly admits, there is evidence of a widespread change of heart today. Not only among the various Christian bodies but among all the religions of the world there is a new willingness to live at peace with one another and to seek as far as may be a common ground of action. In what direction can this spirit of co-operation better find expression than in a concerted attack upon the curse of war?

C. S. PHILLIPS.

NOTICES

WORSHIP IN OTHER LANDS. By the Rev. H. P. Thompson. S.P.G. 2s. 6d.

The problem of worship in the Mission Field is the problem of providing forms which take into account racial traditions and heritage, while retaining the essential content of historic Christianity. Mr. Thompson's book gives an account of a variety of attempts made by missions and individual mission priests to meet this difficulty. We were reminded of the very sound words of the late Bishop Trollope in *Essays Catholic and Missionary* (S.P.C.K., 1928) of the dangers of giving too much freedom to the adaptation of native customs and traditions. "We need far greater knowledge than most of us possess of the agelong philosophy or deep-rooted associations lying behind the use of particular forms, colours, melodies and bodily actions by Indians, Africans, Chinese, Coreans or Japanese to justify us in being certain that these can be incorporated into the Christian tradition" (*op. cit.*, p. 211).

It is one thing to quote Pope Gregory's advice to St. Mellitus, it is another thing to apply that advice in practice. The background of Roman culture which existed then is wholly lacking today.

That culture at least made for uniformity in law and order. Modern Western culture, on the other hand, may easily involve the loss of what is best in native tradition, while substituting some of the worst features of "civilized" life. Yet Mr. Thompson gives many attractive pictures of ceremonies of initiation, observances of festivals, and so on. He specially emphasizes the value of the religious Drama as an evangelistic method. If some of the forms of worship described strike the Western reader as somewhat bizarre, he may be reminded of the need of elasticity. Nothing could be worse than to fasten on to the whole of the Anglican mission field a conventional and rigid Morning Prayer.

It is good to find so much evidence that the Eucharist is recognized by Missions of all types in the Anglican Communion as the great act of Christian worship *par excellence*. Of the Burmese he writes: "The Eucharist becomes, of course, the focus of his worship"; of Japan: "The principal Sunday service is a sung Eucharist at 9"; of Borneo: "Here the great service is the sung Mass"; of Africa: "The devotional spirit finds its expression most fully . . . in the Eucharist."

The book is rendered the more attractive and valuable by its delightful illustrations.

TREVOR JALLAND.

LES ORIGINES DE LA NOËL ET DE L'ÉPIPHANIE. Par Bernard Botte, O.S.M., Abbaye du Mont César. Louvain. 18 fr.

In short compass, written with the utmost clearness, we have here a study of the origin of Christmas and Epiphany, which may be summarized thus. Epiphany was introduced in the East as a festival of the Birth of Christ in the early part of the fourth century. Towards the end of the century the observance of December 25 came from Rome. In the West, in Gaul, Epiphany was probably the earlier. The Latin Epiphany seems to have come to Rome *via* a Western Church, which, adopting the Roman feast of December 25 (which had begun in the early fourth century), had kept January 6 for the Magi only. That Epiphany was an after-thought is proved by the Gospels in the Roman Missal; the Christmas cycle ends on January 5 with the return to Nazareth.

Dom Botte gives all the available evidence with great caution and is content to leave many questions open. When he comes to explain the evidence he states his own views with exemplary boldness. Duchesne's theory, that December 25 was reached on the basis of the date of the Incarnation, March 25, which was also thought to be the date of the Creation, breaks down. For (i.) would the dating of the Incarnation from the *Conception* of our Lord have been congenial to the mind of antiquity? (ii.) The *De Pascha Computus*, which discusses the question, puts the corresponding date on March 28, the fourth day of Creation, when light was created. We are therefore thrown back on the birthday of Sol Invictus on December 25. The Christian feast was the antidote, as indeed Jerome says—"Hodie nobis sol justitiæ nascitur." January 6 was the birthday of Osiris-Dionysos, when fountains were said to flow with wine; it was also the feast of Lights (φῶτα). So in the Church it was specially associated with the Baptism of Christ and the blessing of water, with the illumination of Baptism, and with the Miracle of Cana. The feasts were developed *pari passu* with the great influx of pagan converts in the fourth century by an instinctive movement of the Church with its pastoral care for souls.

I greet this splendid book, which is furnished with an *imprimatur* and *nihil obstat*, with enthusiasm.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

THE GROUP MOVEMENT. Being the first part of the Charge delivered at the Third Quadrennial Visitation of his Diocese, together with an Introduction. By Herbert Hensley Henson, D.D., Lord Bishop of Durham. Milford. 2s. 6d.

When the Bishop of Durham received an invitation from the Group Movement to attend one of their house parties, he was, in his own words, "perturbed and alarmed."

The invitation informed him that the house party "had been planned under the guidance of the Holy Spirit so that men and women might find in their own experience the power of the living Christ, not only to redeem, but also to direct and control."

The Bishop wondered, very naturally, by what right did these people assume that "the power of the living Christ" was an undiscovered fact in Christian experience save for the assistance of house parties. He wrote a temperate and dignified reply, which evidently conceals a desire to say, "Well! of all the impudent—!!! Writing to a bishop like that!!!"

It would be interesting to know what the organizers of the house party

thought of the Bishop's letter. Dr Hensley Henson "does not doubt that many individuals have been brought to repentance and change of life" by the Group Movement. He points out, however, most justly that *For Sinners Only* is a profoundly unsatisfactory book, which assigns no important or even necessary place to the Church, the Sacraments, or to any other "loyalty" save loyalty to the Group itself.

The Group Movement appears to have been unaffected by the Bishop of Durham's criticism, and is going on its boisterous way content with its own triumphs, and apparently unaware that it is reproducing the bad as well as the good elements of traditional revivalism. It would do well to pause a little and consider how to answer Dr. Hensley Henson's accusations.

You Group people, he says, ignore the demands of the intellect in religion. There are grave intellectual difficulties which attach to the acceptance of Christianity, and you behave as if these were non-existent.

Again, your Movement is too closely bound to the moods and claims of adolescence. The problems and conflicts of adult life demand something more adequate than cheerful affirmation and impulsive "sharing" of untested emotional states.

You Groupists present a too limited and meagre conception of Christianity. Your way seems to you the only way, and you lightly set aside the gathered wisdom of the ages which the Church treasures for her children. In fact, you young people imagine that, because you have had some genuine Christian experience, nobody else has ever known as much as you, and you are only too ready to teach those whose riper wisdom will put you to shame.

The Bishop's book is most thoughtful and weighty. It should be read by all those who rejoice in the genuine revival of interest in religion which the Group Movement has brought about; first of all by the Groupists themselves, who ought to have the courage to face their own faults, and then by those who are concerned lest the Movement should make not for unity and brotherly love, as it professes to, but ultimately for bitterness and a recrudescence of sectarianism.

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

LIVES OF THE TRACTARIANS: John Henry Newman, by F. L. Cross; John Keble, by Kenneth Ingram; Edward Bouverie Pusey, by Leonard Prestige. London: Philip Allan and Co., Ltd. 6s. net. each.

Among the plentiful crop of literature evoked by the centenary of the Oxford Movement the series of short biographies published by Messrs. Philip Allan and Co., under the title of *Lives of the Tractarians*, specially merits attention.

The names of the authors are a sufficient indication that the task of writing the biographies has been put into competent hands. The scale on which they are written (from 160 to 180 pages in large type) obviously does not permit of anything in the way of detailed and elaborate treatment. The biography of the Oxford Movement is extensive: and those who require a more exhaustive account of its various heroes may be referred to the older and larger books—if, that is, they have the courage to tackle them; for such a work as Liddon's four-volume *Life of Dr. Pusey*, in particular, would tax the stamina of the most heroic reader. What the authors of the present series have sought to do is to provide in a concise and popular form all the information concerning the lives and personalities

of their respective subjects that the ordinary educated Churchman is likely to require, at the same time indicating the principles for which they stood and the significance of the main events in which they took part in the religious travail of their own time and of the generations that have succeeded. This at least is true of Mr. Ingram and Mr. Prestige. Both of these are graceful and accomplished writers, and skilful exponents of the modern type of sprightly and "alembicated" biography first brought into vogue by Lytton Strachey and so diligently exploited since. Mr. Prestige's manner is the more striking and epigrammatic, but with occasional lapses into *odium theologicum* that are commendably absent from the pages of Mr. Ingram. Dr. Cross's book goes rather deeper. This is the more possible inasmuch as, while his colleagues have to cover in each case the whole of a long life, his study of Newman stops short at 1845—apart from a final chapter on the Vatican Council, illustrating Newman's attitude to an event that so bitterly falsified the hopes of his old associates who remained faithful to the Church of their baptism. His book, however, is less a detailed account of Newman's Anglican career than a study of Newman's subtle and fascinating personality—so exquisitely gifted yet by no means without its weaknesses and egotisms—and of his philosophical and theological attitude. His account of these reveals wide reading and much suggestive insight, if at times a little disfigured by a rather superfluous appeal to the authority of recondite German books in support of statements that we should be quite prepared to accept on the authority of Dr. Cross himself. The letters (printed in an appendix) of the Cardinal to the Rev. Charles Plummer are new material and contain not a little that is of interest.

The first and most abiding impression of the reader of these volumes must be that of the sanctity and deep spirituality of the characters portrayed. Newman was hardly a saint, though he strove hard to be; but there can be no doubt about Pusey's and Keble's claim to that title, even though in Pusey's case at least the saintliness is not always without a certain morbid tinge. And of all three it is true to say that the spiritual world had for them an intense reality hardly shared by the world of sense and affairs in which, for all their activity in it, they were always a good deal less than at home. It is this other-worldliness of the Tractarians that at once explained and limited their influence. Even more than their insistence on the majesty and authority of the Church and the priesthood, it recalled a clergy largely sunk in worldliness and routine to their vocation as men who, charged to be specially the representatives of the spiritual order before men, must maintain themselves in unceasing and vital contact with it. From this point of view their influence has been effective far beyond the circle of those who have inherited their theological standpoint. On the other hand, the same trait largely explains why (as Mr. Ingram with admirable candour admits) "the activity of the Oxford Movement has been limited largely to the ecclesiastical sphere; it has made converts among the clergy rather than the laity." This limitation is partly due to the comparative weakness of at least the rank-and-file of its votaries on the intellectual side and to their failure to show much interest in the achievements of modern thought and discovery; but still more, perhaps, to their tendency to stand aloof from the movements that stir the hearts and shape the lives of men in these latter days. This aloofness is not unconnected with the Tractarian insistence on a "fugitive and cloistered virtue" that can hardly be realized by those

who have to do the rough work of the world. It is idle to deny that, in maintaining their exquisite sense of spiritual realities, such men as Keble and Pusey were not a little helped by the fact that they were men of comfortable means, engaged in work of a very exceptional kind and wholly removed from the brute struggle and dull, monotonous tasks of common human existence. This is by no means said by way of criticism, for excellence in any branch of achievement usually means specialization. It merely reminds us that, however admirable in itself, their witness to the Christian life in its wholeness is necessarily a little one-sided.

C. S. PHILLIPS.

AN IDEALIST VIEW OF LIFE. By S. Radhakrishnan. G. Allen and Unwin. 12s. 6d.

I always feel a thrill of pleasurable excitement when I open a parcel of books to be reviewed for THEOLOGY. They are usually books that make one think, and, even in Cambridge, one can do with a little more intellectual stimulus. When, however, I unwrapped this volume, I sighed. "Here," I said to myself, "is yet another book on what Oscar Browning called The Higher Twaddle. Here is Hindu pseudo-mysticism dished up for the benefit of idle ladies, who, tired of New Thought, Christian Science, and Spiritualism, now want to be taught to sit cross-legged on the floor and say 'Om.'"

Never was I more mistaken. Here is an extremely able, sound, well-balanced work, the product of a mature mind and an understanding heart. With the exception of a few pages, a book that one would have liked to have written one's self?

The style must first be praised. Such clear, vigorous English can only come from clear and vigorous thinking. Now and then it rises to heights of poetic diction, and we feel that the author adds the sensibility of the artist to the intellect of a scholar.

The matter deserves equal praise with the style. The arrangement is simple, harmonious and logical. The main argument is never lost sight of, and the proof is built up, stone by stone, into an imposing edifice of thought. Difficulties are never shirked, objections are boldly dealt with. The reader never feels that he is being hurried into conclusions for which he is not ready, or pushed blindfold past other roads down which he might have turned. He has a sense that he is being treated fairly, and that if he and his guide come to a point where they must part, they will part with affection and respect. Too often when we read a work of theology or metaphysics we are conscious that we are being bullied, cajoled or bewitched. Dr. Radhakrishnan may be trusted to do none of these, even if we differ from him here and there.

Perhaps in the form of lectures his words were somewhat difficult to listen to. We miss the wealth of examples which must have made "The Varieties of Religious Experience" such attractive hearing. *An Idealist View of Life* would offer an audience too exacting a sequence of abstract thought, too many epigrammatic pronouncements, too many allusions to philosophies Eastern and Western. Read at leisure and carefully pondered, the book is altogether delightful.

In Lectures 1 and 2 we have "The Modern Challenge to Religion," and a searching enquiry into "Substitutes for Religion." Dr. Radhakrishnan puts the case for Naturalistic Atheism, Agnosticism, etc., so persuasively that, while we read, we are almost convinced of their

validity, and draw a breath of relief when he vigorously rejects them and turns, in the third lecture, to "Religious Experience and its Affirmations."

This is, perhaps, the finest chapter in the book. The author sets out eloquently his reasons for believing in the validity of the mystical experience. He is convinced that men of all religions have had the same mystical experience and that differences arise in the interpretation of it. Intellectual predispositions inevitably colour the interpretation, but leave the experience untouched. Spiritual experience might be likened to the white flame of a light before which devotees of various religions had placed glass of different hues, each claiming that his colour and his colour alone was "the truth."

Dr. Radhakrishnan examines at some length the nature of the "intuition" which leads us straight to the experience of Reality, while "intellect" is arguing about the nature of the approach. He is on the whole sympathetic to Bergson and a little hard on Croce, but he has considered the opinions of all the chief Greek, Indian, and Christian philosophers before forming his own. He emphatically asserts his belief in the spiritual nature of man and in that divine spark within us whereby we apprehend the Divinity external to ourselves.

"The ultimate assumption of all life is the spirit in us, the divine in man. Life is God, and the proof of it is life itself. If somewhere within ourselves we did not know with absolute certainty that God is, we could not live. . . . Our lives are not lived within their own limits. We are not ourselves alone. We are God-men."

Readers interested in literary criticism will turn with special pleasure to Chapter V., "The Spirit in Man," where they will find many acute sayings on artistic achievement and the nature of true poetry. More people, perhaps, will linger over "Matter, Life and Mind," where the battle and the truce between Science and Religion is admirably described. In "Human Personality and its Destiny" the case for Karma and rebirth is stated persuasively, and different theories of Immortality are weighed. But in the last chapter, Dr. Radhakrishnan bows his head before the mystery of Ultimate Reality, and knows that when he has said, "We call the supreme the Absolute when we view it apart from the cosmos, God in relation to the cosmos. The Absolute is the pre-cosmic nature of God, and God is the Absolute from the cosmic point of view," he is using words where nothing is valid but silence and adoration.

There is one question that we should like to ask. How is it that Dr. Radhakrishnan, who seems so sensitive to spiritual "values," has failed to notice the uniqueness of Jesus? (I do not say of "our Lord," for that title has theological implications which he would with difficulty accept.) Has he not observed the sinlessness of Jesus? The faintest noise breaks silence as effectively as the loudest clamour—so the smallest sin effectively mars perfection. Many have been the prophets of noble character and marvellous insight, but has there been one without sin? We may gladly admit the existence of a divine spark in each one of us, which in the prophets becomes a consuming fire. But in the case of Jesus, was not this divine fire co-extensive with his whole nature? Have we not here something different—unique?

Dr. Radhakrishnan will never be Catholic or Protestant, Anglican or Free Church, Presbyterian or Methodist. Christian, however, in the most comprehensive sense he may yet well be.

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

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